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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CINDY DEATS,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 860372

COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK,
Defendant/Respondent.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the Petitioner accurately presented the points

essential to this Court's consideration of her petition pursuant
to Rule 46(e), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court?
2.

Whether the decision by the Utah Court of Appeals

conflicts with prior decisions by this Court?
3.

Whether C.S.B. is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to

Rule 33, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court?
REPORT OF OPINION ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
The decision of the Court of Appeals in the above-entitled
case is officially reported.

See, Peats v. Commercial Security

Bank, 746 P.2d 1191 (Utah App. 1987).
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS FOR OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION
The grounds alleged by the Petitioner in an attempt to
persuade this Court to exercise judicial discretion and consider
review by a Writ of Certiorari, do not constitute "special and
important" reasons within the meaning of Rule 43, Rules of the
Utah

Supreme

400559.jae

Court.

In particular,
1

the

Court

of Appeals1

affirmance of the jury's verdict finding that Commercial Security
Bank ("C.S.B,") was not negligent, did not raise any questions of
state law in conflict with any decisions of this Court.
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF STATUTES
Rule 43, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court (See, Appendix)
Rule 33, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court (See, Appendix)
Rule 40, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court (See, Appendix)
Rule 46(e), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court (See, Appendix)
Rule 40, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeal (See, Appendix)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On or about September 24, 1984, the Petitioner commenced a
negligence action against C.S.B.

On March 18 and 20, 1986, the

action was tried before a jury of 8 members.

The jurors were

read

David

39

jury

instructions

by

the

Honorable

E. Roth,

including Instruction No. 25, which was the sole instruction
relied upon by Petitioner for purposes of her appeal to the Court
of Appeals.

The jury was instructed on comparative negligence,

the duty of care required of business invitors and the duty of
care required of a Plaintiff in a negligence action.

The jury

returned a special verdict finding that C.S.B. was not negligent
and judgment was entered on April 8, 1986.
Petitioner filed her Motion for New Trial.

On April 17, 1986,
On June 2, 1986, the

Petitioner's Motion for a New Trial was heard and denied by the
Court.
On or about July 7, 1986, Petitioner filed a Notice of
Appeal.

On November 24, 1987, the case was argued before a panel

400559.jae
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of the Utah Court of Appeals.

On December 15, 1987, the Court of

Appeals filed its decision Peats v. Commercial Security Bank, 746
P.2d 1191 (Utah App. 1987).

The Court of Appeals held that the

trial court properly denied Petitioner's motion for a new trial,
the jury's verdict that CSB was not negligent was adequately
supported by the evidence and that Instruction No. 25, when read
with

the

other

Plaintiff's

duty

instructions, was
in

a

a

negligence

correct
action.

Commercial Security Bank. 746 P.2d at 1194.
13,

1988, the Petition

statement
See,

of a

Peats

v.

On or about January

for Writ of Certiorari was filed by

Plaintiff.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On Monday, February 27, 1984, Plaintiff drove up the three
ramps in the CSB parking lot and found a place to park on the
fourth level at approximately 7:05 a.m. (T. at 69, 71, 73 and
125.)

Plaintiff's car slid while driving up the parking ramps

and she walked very carefully because she could see how very,
very icy it was while walking away from her parking place.
at 72-73, 78-89 and 125.)

(T.

Plaintiff arrived at work prior to

business hours and the time that most persons that used the
parking lot arrived.

(T. at 70, 164-154 and 193.)

Plaintiff

arrived prior to sunrise at a time when the coldest temperatures
are commonly recorded.

(T. at 213.)

On that Monday morning,

following a winter snowstorm, Plaintiff was the first person to
arrive at the parking lot.

400559.jae

(T. at 69-70 and 125.)
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Indeed,

Plaintiff stated that another person was not expected to arrive
for 25 minutes.

(T. at 70, 128.)

After the Plaintiff had parked her car and was walking
towards the stairwell to exit the parking terrace, she thought
about how slippery the parking terrace was, and that the next car
that came up the ramp might slide into her car.

(T. at 79.)

Accordingly, Plaintiff turned around and walked very carefully,
because of the icy conditions, back toward her car to move it
into a safer parking

space.

(T. at 79-80.)

As Plaintiff

approached the front of her car, she slipped and fell.
80.)

(T. at

An individual in a van was on the top level of the lot to

spread

salt or sand by the time Plaintiff had regained her

balance and was again standing upright, somewhere between 7:10
and 7:20 a.m. (T. at 83, 84 and 130-131.)

Plaintiff proceeded

back down the stairwell from the fourth level and across the
street to work, where she remained until later that afternoon.
(T. at 85.)
ARGUMENT I
PETITIONER FAILED TO ACCURATELY PRESENT THE POINTS
ESSENTIAL TO A CONSIDERATION OF THE PETITION FOR WRIT
OF CERTIORARI
Review by a Writ of Certiorari is a matter of judicial
discretion and special and important reasons must be proven for
the Court to grant the petition.
Supreme Court.

See, Rule 43, Rules of the Utah

Petitioner initially asserts that a Writ should

be issued by the Court because Peats v. Commercial Security
Bank, conflicts with principles of law in Moore v. Burton Lumber
400559.jae
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& Hardware Co., 631 P.2d 865 (Utah 1981); Jacobsen Construction
Co. , Inc. v. Structo-Lite Engineering, Inc., 619 P.2d 306 (Utah
1980)

and

Stephens v. Henderson. 741 P.2d

952

(Utah

1987).

However, Petitioner's justification for issuance of a Writ of
Certiorari does not support her initial assertion, since she
merely contends that the decisions by the Utah Supreme Court
"seem to indicate that a jury should" focus on a different duty
of care for the injured party and Instruction No. 25 contains
language that "implies" a contrary duty of care.
The Petitioner's contention that the cases seem to indicate
a different duty of care than that implied in Instruction No. 25
is

an

insufficient

reason

for

the

Court

discretion to issue a Writ of Certiorari.

to

exercise

its

Indeed, Rule 43,

Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, expressly provides that an
instance appropriate for review is "[w]hen a panel of the Court
of Appeals has decided a question of state or federal law in a
way that is in conflict with a decision of this court..."
present

case,

Petitioner

does

not

clearly

In the

identify

any

unqualified issues of state law that the Court of Appeals has
decided in a way that

conflict with a decision of this Court.

Moreover, the purported justification for review of Petitioner's
case does not present special and important reasons for granting
review by a Writ of Certiorari.

Petitioner's most elaborate

argument is that jury instruction No. 25, when read by itself,
was

an

incorrect

statement

of

law.

The Court of Appeals,

however, rejected strict construction of instruction No. 25 in
400559.jae
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disregard of the thirty-eight other jury instructions.

Thus,

Petitioner has simply attempted to re-allege a technical ground
for issuance of the Writ which was previously rejected by the
Court of Appeals and the trial court.
Petitioner's

qualified,

conditional

and ambiguous claims

that a conflict exists between decisions by the Utah Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals fail to establish special and
important reasons for granting review.

The failure and inability

of Petitioner to allege with particularity reasons for this Court
to exercise its discretion and review the case constitutes a
failure to accurately present points essential for consideration
of the petition.

Therefore, the provisions of Rule 46(e), Rules

of the Utah Supreme Court, mandate that the petition should be
denied.
ARGUMENT II
THE DECISION BY THE COURT OF APPEALS DOES NOT CONFLICT
WITH PRIOR DECISIONS BY THIS COURT
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals1

decision

conflicts with principles of law in certain Utah Supreme Court
opinions.

However, the Court of Appeals explicitly relied upon

the applicable principles set forth in the Utah Supreme Court
decisions.
First, the Court of Appeals noted that Petitioner attempted
to impeach the jury's verdict that C.S.B. was not negligent.
Court

of

Appeals

noted

that

it

was

well-settled

that

The
an

appellate court should review the jury verdict "in the light
400559.jae
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most favorable to the prevailing party, and accord the evidence
presented and every reasonable inference fairly drawn from the
evidence the same degree of deference."
Security

Bank,

746

P. 2d

at

1192

Peats v. Commercial

(relying

upon

Jacobsen

Construction. Co. Inc. v. Structo-Lite Engineering, Inc., 619
P.2d at 308).
Preliminarily, the Court of Appeals found that the evidence
presented must demonstrate that the business invitor failed to
meet the requisite duty of care.

This duty of care was best

described as follows:
The essential inquiry relating to defendant's
negligence is whether the defendant's employees know, or in
the exercise of ordinary care should have known that a
dangerous condition existed, and whether sufficient time
elapsed thereafter that action could have been taken to
correct the situation.
Owners of stores, banks, office
buildings, theaters of other public buildings where the
public is invited to come on business or for pleasure are
not insurers against all forms of accidents that may happen
to any who come.
Martin v. Safewav Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1977);
see also. Peats v. Commercial Security Bank, 746 P.2d at 1192.
In accordance with the invitorfs

duty of care the Court of

Appeals found that the jury verdict was adequately supported by
the

evidence

C.S.B.'s

that

parking

C.S.B. was servicing the
lot

at

the

time

fourth

Petitioner

level of

arrived,

that

Petitioner admittedly knew the level was icy, that Petitioner
conceded that she did not have to park on that level and that
Petitioner

arrived

attempted

impeachment

concerning
400559.jae

the

prior to sunrise.
of

jurors'

the

jury

purported
7

Moreover, Petitioner's
verdict
failure

with

affidavits

to

understand

Instruction No. 25 was found to be in direct contravention of
Rule 59(a)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

See also, Rosenlof

v. Sullivan, 676 P.2d 373,375 (Utah 1983).
Second, the Court of Appeals relied heavily upon Moore v.
Burton

Lumber

&

Hardware

Co.,

631

P.2d

865, and

Jacobsen

Construction Co., Inc. v. Structo-Lite Engineering, Inc.. 619
P.2d 306, to reject Petitioner's assertion that Instruction No.
25 misstated the law concerning an injured party's duty of care.
Thus, it is ironic that Petitioner would assert that these same
cases are in conflict with the Court of Appeals' decision.
Petitioner contends that Instruction No. 25 implies that if
Petitioner was at all negligent, she is barred from recovery.
Instruction No. 25 provides as follows:
INSTRUCTION NO. 25
Ordinarily, a Plaintiff in any action has the
duty of
seeing and avoiding, if reasonable,
a hazard which is
plainly visible, and if
the Plaintiff reasonably failed to
d o
so, then the Plaintiff is negligent either in
failing to
look or in failing to heed
what he or she saw.
Instruction

No.

25

"assumption

of

risk"

negligence statutes.
allegations

that

does

not

constitute

instruction

under

an
Utah's

impermissible
comparative

The Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner's
Instruction

No.

25

improperly

principles of assumption of risk, as follows:
Under Utah's comparative negligence statute,
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-27-38 (1987), and
its accompanying definition counterpart, Utah
Code Ann. Section 78-27-37 (1987), the
concept of contributory negligence includes
what was formerly termed secondary assumption
400559.jae
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included

of risk:
"the unreasonable encountering of
a known and appreciated risk."
Moore v.
Burton Lumber & Hardware Co. . 631 P.2d 865,
870 (Utah 1981); see, Jacobsen Constr. Co.
619 P.2d at 310, 312. More specifically,
the reasonableness of Plaintiff's
conduct in confronting a known or
unknown risk created by defendant's
negligence will basically be
determined under principles of
contributory
negligence.
Attention should be focused on
whether a reasonably prudent man
in the exercise of due care would
have incurred the risk, despite
his knowledge of it, and if so,
whether he would have conducted
himself in the manner in which the
Plaintiff acted in light of all the
surrounding
circumstances,
including the appreciated risk.
Jacobsen Constr. Co., 619 P.2d at 312.
Peats v. Commercial Security Bank, 746 P.2d 1193-94.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the ordinary and usual
meaning of Instruction No. 25, when read together with all of the
other instructions, was that "the jury must apportion negligence
if both parties were found to have acted negligently."

Id. at

60.
In Moore v. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co., 631 P.2d 865 (Utah
1981),

the

Court

expressly

considered

the

comparative negligence and assumption of risk.

issues

concerning

The jury verdict

indicated that Plaintiff and Defendant were negligent, but only
Defendant
injuries.

was

the

proximate

cause

of

Plaintiff's

personal

Defendant claimed that the trial court improperly

refused to instruct the jury that there was no duty to warn a
business invitee of an obvious danger.
400559.jae
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The Court ruled that the

trial court should have instructed the jury that Defendant had no
duty to warn of an obvious danger, but failure to so instruct the
jury was harmless error.

Thus, the Court expressly ruled that a

jury instruction substantially similar to the instruction given
in the present case, should have been read to the jury by the
trial court.
Additionally, the Court considered the trial court's refusal
to instruct the jury concerning the doctrine of assumption of
risk.

The Court explained that three different legal concepts

are embodied by the doctrine of assumption of risk.

The two

widely

"primary

recognized

forms

are

implied" assumption of risk.
was defined as

"primary

express"

and

Primary express assumption of risk

"an agreement by the Plaintiff to accept the risk

or danger, and the primary implied form involves a relationship
in which Defendant simply owes no duty of care to the Plaintiff."
Id.

The third form is "secondary" assumption of risk, which

involves an aspect of contributory negligence, since it is the
unreasonable encountering of a known and appreciated risk.

The

Jacobsen Construction Co., Inc. opinion was cited as controlling
regarding

the distinction between

comparative

negligence and

assumption of risk and the Court, therefore, quoted at length
from Jacobsen Construction Co.

Specifically, to the extent that

the doctrine of assumption of risk involves the reasonableness of
a Plaintiff's confrontation of a known and appreciated risk and
the manner

in which a Plaintiff

acted

in light of all the

surrounding circumstances, the principles of assumption of risk
400559.jae

10

will basically be determined under principles of contributory
negligence•

The

Court

concluded

that

instructions

on both

assumption of risk and contributory negligence were proper, but
not necessary in that case.
Accordingly,

the

Moore

and

Jacobsen

Construction

Co.

opinions are additional authority in support of Instruction No.
25, not cases which conflict with Peats v. Commercial Security
Bank.
In Stephens v. Henderson, 741 P.2d 953, 955 (Utah 1987), the
Court simply relied upon the Jacobsen Construction Co. decision,
found the above-referenced principles controlling and affirmed
the jury's verdict for Plaintiff in a personal injury action.
The Court, however, held that that trial court properly refused
to give a separate assumption of risk jury instruction, since it
was treated under the contributory negligence instructions.
In conclusion, the jury verdict, particularly when reviewed
in

the

light

most

favorable

to

the

prevailing

party,

was

supported by ample evidence that C.S.B. met or exceeded the
requisite duty of care for a business invitor and, therefore, was
not

negligent.

Moreover, Instruction No. 25 was a correct

statement of Petitioner's duty of care under the applicable case
law, including Moore v. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co. , Jacobsen
Construction

Co., Inc. v. Structo-Lite Engineering, Inc. and

Stephens v. Henderson. In fact, as the Court of Appeals noted,
the cited Utah Supreme Court cases explicitly provide that an
assumption of risk instruction is proper where the contributory
400559.jae
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negligence instructions, when read as a whole, require the jury
to apportion negligence if both parties were found to have acted
negligently. Finally, this Court held in the Moore decision that
the trial court should have given an instruction substantially
similar to Instruction No. 25.
ARGUMENT III
C.S.B. IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO RULE
33, RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
The present appeal is Petitioner's third attempt to reverse
the jury's verdict.

The trial court denied Petitioner's motion

for a new trial and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court.

Petitioner's repeated

attempts to overturn the jury

verdict are made despite the well-established concept that "[a]
party

claiming

that the evidence does not support a jury's

verdict carries a heavy burden."
766,

769

(Utah

extraordinary

1985).

writ

to

In

Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d

this

reverse

the

case
jury

Petitioner does not cite any dispositive

Petitioner

seeks

verdict.

an

However,

legal authority or

undisputed facts which would entitle her to such relief.

Indeed,

Petitioner's alleged rights depend upon technical and strained
interpretations of authority, despite rejection of these same
arguments

by

the

lower

courts

in

reliance

upon

the

same

authority.
Rule 33(a), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, provides that
the Court may award just damages, including reasonable attorney's
fees when "a motion made or an appeal taken under these rules is
either frivolous or for delay...."
400559.jae
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The present Petition for Writ

of Certiorari

is necessarily

However, as the

Court

either for delay

of Appeals

noted

or frivolous.

fl

[w]hile

it may be

possible to determine when an action is taken for delay, the
question

of what

is a frivolous appeal

is more difficult."

O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 310 (Utah App. 1987).
The Court of Appeals noted that in Cady v. Johnson 671 P.2d
149,

151

(Utah 1983), the Court defined frivolous within the

meaning of Rule 33, as those matters "without merit."

However,

something more than a showing that an appeal was without merit
was required or a "loser pay" situation would result.
the

Respondent

evidenced

was

an absence

not

obligated

of good

to

show

that

faith, although

showing is the trial court standard.

Moreover,
the

appeal

such a strict

Consequently, the Court of

Appeals sought guidance from Rule 40(a), Rules of the Utah Court
of Appeals, which provides, in pertinent part, that the signature
of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate that to the
best of the attorney's or party's knowledge, information and
belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, the brief, motion or
other paper signed is well grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law.
The Court of Appeals found the definition in Rule 40(a)
controlling on the grounds that the definition was sufficiently
objective that it could be applied without delving

into the

parties' subjective intent and the lesser appellate standard was
justified because "the decision to appeal should be reached only
after careful consideration by the party and counsel."
400559.jae
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O'Brien

v. Rush, 744 P.2d at 310. Rule 40(a), Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court, is virtually identical to Rule 40(a), Rules of the court
of Appeals, and the Court of Appeals ruling should be controlling
herein.

Petitioner's successive appeals prejudice C.S.B. and the

reduced appellate standard for a frivolous appeal was intended to
protect

entities

considerable

such as C.S.B.

expense

unfairly

from the endless delay and
imposed

upon

respondents

by

frivolous appeals. The frivolous nature of this Petition is
demonstrated by Petitioner's contention that sufficient grounds
exist for a Writ based upon cases extensively cited by the Court
of Appeals to affirm the jury verdict. Furthermore, Petitioner
has failed to acknowledge that she must meet a very heavy burden
to overturn a jury verdict, especially where the verdict has
already been affirmed by the trial court and appellate court.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner's qualified, conditional and ambiguous assertion
that

certain

Utah

Supreme

Court

cases

seem

to

indicate

a

different duty of care than that implied in Instruction No. 25 is
an insufficient ground for this Court to exercise its discretion
and review the case and constitutes a failure to accurately
present points essential for consideration of the petition.
Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court decisions cited by
Petitioner do not conflict with the published opinion of the
Court of Appeals.
Jacobsen

In Moore v. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co. ,

Construction

Co., Inc. v.

Structo-Lite

Engineering,

Inc. , and Stephens v. Henderson, the Court described an injured
400559.jae
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party's

duty

of

care

and

ruled

that

instructions

on

both

assumption of risk and contributory negligence were proper where
the contributory negligence instructions, when read as a whole,
require the jury to apportion negligence if both parties were
found to have acted negligently.
decisions were

relied

Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court

upon by

the Court of Appeals as the

primary authority to affirm the jury verdict.

Instruction No. 25

was a correct statement of Petitioner's duty of care when read
with the other contributory negligence instructions.
Finally, the Petitioner has made three frivolous attempts to
reverse the jury's verdict which has wasted judicial resources,
resulted

in

considerable

Proceedings

before

Plaintiff's

actions

the

£elay

trial

lacked

and

court

good

prejudiced

require

faith.

a

showing

However,

standard governs the decision to appeal.

C.S.B.

a

that
lesser

In particular, the

decision to appeal must be formed after reasonable inquiry and be
well

grounded

in

fact

Petitioner's

dilatory

contravention

of Rule

and
and

warranted
frivolous

by

appeal

existing
is

in

law.
direct

33, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.

Petitioner's reliance on Utah Supreme Court decisions extensively
cited by the Court of Appeals is patently insufficient to meet
the heavy burden Petitioner has to satisfy to overturn a jury
verdict.

400559.jae

15

Therefore, C.S.B. respectfully requests that the petition
for Writ of Certiorari be denied and C.S.B. be awarded its
attorney fees herein.
DATED this tt

iy

day of February, 1988.

CL (•- ^ '-\\ - j
k
Donatd J . P u r s e r , E s q .
J . Angus Edwarirds, E s q .

: _

PURSER, OVERHOLT & OKAZAKI, P.C.
39 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Respondent/Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

caused

a

true

and

correct

—lib

copy

of

day of

February, 1988, I

BRIEF

IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI to be served upon the following
by depositing copies thereof in the United States mails, postage
prepaid, addressed as follows:
Robert A. Echard
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD
635-25th Street
Ogden, Utah 844 01
Attorney for Petitioner/Plaintiff
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Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery
of attorney's fees.
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. If the court shall determine
that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or for
delay, it shall award just damages and single or double costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, to the prevailing party.
(b) Disciplinary action for inadequate representation. The court may
take appropriate disciplinary action against counsel who inadequately represents his client on appeal.

Rule 43. Considerations governing review of certiorari.
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons
therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the
court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered:
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the
same issue of law;
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of this
court;
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call
for an exercise of this court's power of supervision; or
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled
by this court.

Rule 40, Attorney's or party's certificate; sanctions and
discipline.
(a) Attorney's or party's certificate. Every motion, brief, and other paper
of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney
of record who is an active member in good standing of the bar of this court, in
his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his motion, brief, or other paper and state his
address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, motions, briefs, or other papers need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit.
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he
has read the motion, brief, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in
fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; and that it is not interposed for
an
Y improper purposes, such as to harass or cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a motion, brief, or other paper is not
Sl
gned as required by this rule, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly
*fter the omission is called to the attention of the attorney or party. If a
Motion, brief, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon
Motion or sua sponte, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a repre*£ted party, or both an appropriate sanction, which may include dismissal or
**^nnance of the appeal, sanctions and discipline under Paragraph (b) of this
^*e> or an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reason*^e expenses incurred because of the filing of the motion, brief, or other
Per> including a reasonable attorney fee.
lb) Sanctions and discipline of attorneys and parties. The court may,
"*r reasonable notice and an opportunity to show cause to the contrary, and
^ ° n hearing, if requested, take appropriate action against any attorney or
p^°n who practices before it for conduct unbecoming a member of the bar or
Jj 0 n allowed to appear before the court, or for failure to comply with these
^ of the court or order of the court. Any action to suspend or disbar a
Corn* °^ ^ e Utah State Bar shall be referred to the Ethics and Discipline
bisr,rril^ee °^ ^ e State Bar for proceedings in accordance with the Rules of
^ P l i n e of the State Bar.
^ ^ u te does not affect contempt power. This rule shall not be con(d) A"° ^ m ^ o r impair the court's inherent and statutory contempt powers.
^ A p p e a r a n c e of counsel pro hac vice. An attorney who is licensed to
**itihCe ^ e ^ 0re tk e b a r °f a s i s t e r state or a foreign country but who is not a
l ^ l e r of the bar of this court may appear, upon motion, pro hac vice. Such
^ i ey shall have associated with him an active member in good standing of
*i*er r °^ this court and shall be subject to the provisions of this rule and all
^les of appellate procedure.
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RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

(C) reliance upon Rule 44(c), where a cross-petition for a writ of
certiorari is filed, stating the filing date of the petition for a writ of
certiorari in connection with which the cross-petition is filed; and
(D) the statutory provision believed to confer on this court jurisdiction to review the decision in question by a writ of certiorari.
(7) Controlling provisions of constitutions, statutes, ordinances, and
regulations that the case involves, setting them out verbatim and giving
the appropriate citation therefor. If the controlling provisions involved
are lengthy, their citation alone will suffice at this point and their pertinent text shall be set forth in the appendix referred to in Subparagraph
(10) of this paragraph.
(8) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly
the nature of the case, the course of the proceedings, and its disposition in
the lower courts. There shall follow a statement of the facts relevant to
the issues presented for review. All statements of fact and references to
the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record before
and to the opinion of the Court of Appeals.
(9) With respect to each question presented, a direct and concise argument for the issuance of the writ. (See Rule 43.)
(10) An appendix containing, in the following order:
(A) copies of all opinions, including concurring and dissenting
opinions, and all orders, including any order on rehearing, delivered
by the Court of Appeals in rendering the decision sought to be reviewed;
(B)- copies of any other opinions, findings of fact, conclusions of law,
orders, judgments, or decrees that were rendered in the case or in
companion cases by the Court of Appeals and by other courts or by
administrative agencies and that are relevant to the questions presented (each of those documents shall include the caption showing
the name of the issuing court or agency, the title and number of the
case, and the date of its entry); and
(C) any other judicial or administrative opinions or orders that are
relevant to the questions presented but were not entered in the case
that is the subject of the petition.
If the material that is required by Subparagraphs (7) and (10) of this paragraph is voluminous, such may, if more convenient, be separately presented.
(b) Form of petition. The petition for a writ of certiorari shall comply with
the form of a brief as specified in Rule 27(a)(l)-(3), except that the cover of the
petition shall be white. The clerk shall examine all petitions before filing, and
if a petition is not prepared in accordance with Rule 27(a)(D-(3) and this
paragraph, it will not be filed, but shall be returned to be properly prepared.
(c) No separate brief. All contentions in support of a petition for a writ of
certiorari shall be set forth in the body of the petition, as provided in Subparagraph (a) (9) of this rule. No separate brief in support of a petition for a writ of
certiorari will be received, and the clerk will refuse to file any petition for a
writ of certiorari to which is annexed or appended any supporting brief.
(d) Page limitation. The petition for a writ of certiorari shall be as short as
possible, but may not exceed 20 pages, excluding the subject index, the table
of authorities, any verbatim quotations required by Subparagraph (a)(7) of
this rule, and the appendix.
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Rule 47

(e) Absence of accuracy, brevity, and clarity. The failure of a petitioner
to present with accuracy, brevity, and clarity whatever is essential to a ready
and adequate understanding of the points requiring consideration will be a
sufficient reason for denying the petition.
(Enacted effective April 20, 1987.)

Rule 47. Brief in opposition; reply brief; brief of amicus
curiae.
(a) Brief in opposition. The respondent shall have 30 days (unless enlarged by the court pursuant to Rule 22(b)) after service of a petition in which
to file ten copies of an opposing brief, disclosing any matter or ground why the
case should not be reviewed by this court. Such brief shall comply with the
requirements of Rule 46, as applicable, and comply with the form of a brief as
specified in Rule 27(a)(l)-(3), except that the cover of the brief shall be orange.
The clerk shall examine all briefs before filing, and if a brief is not prepared in
accordance with Rule 27(a)(l)-(3) and with the proper cover, it will not be
filed, but shall be returned to be properly prepared. Four copies of the brief
shall be served as prescribed by Rule 21 on counsel for each party separately
represented.
(b) Page limitation. A brief in opposition shall be as short as possible and
may not, in any single case, exceed 20 pages, excluding the subject index, the
table of authorities, any verbatim quotations required by Rule 46(a)(7), and
the appendix.
(c) Objections to jurisdiction. No motion by a respondent to dismiss a
petition for a writ of certiorari will be received. Objections to the jurisdiction
of the court to grant the writ of certiorari may be included in the brief in
opposition.
(d) Distribution of filings. Upon the filing of a brief in opposition, the
expiration of the time allowed therefor, or express waiver of the right to file,
the petition and the brief, if any, will be distributed by the clerk to the court
for consideration. However, if a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari has been
filed, distribution of both it and the petition for a writ of certiorari will be
delayed until the filing of a brief in opposition by the cross-respondent, the
expiration of the time allowed therefor, or express waiver of the right to file.
(e) Reply brief. A reply brief addressed to arguments first raised in the
brief in opposition may be filed by any petitioner, but distribution under
paragraph (d) hereof will not be delayed pending the filing of any such brief.
Such brief shall be as short as possible, but may not exceed five pages. Such
brief shall comply with the form of a brief as specified in Rule 27(a)(l)-(3),
except that the cover of the brief shall be yellow. The clerk shall examine all
briefs before filing, and if a brief is not prepared in accordance with Rule
27(a)(l)-(3) and with the proper cover, it will not be filed, but shall be returned
to be properly prepared. Ten copies of the brief shall be filed, and four copies
shall be served as prescribed by Rule 21 on counsel for each party separately
represented.
(f) Brief of amicus curiae. A brief of an amicus curiae may be filed only if
accompanied by written consent of all parties, by leave of the court granted on
potion, or at the request of the court. A motion for leave shall identify the
interest of the applicant and shall state the reasons why a brief of an amicus
curiae is desirable. Except as all parties otherwise consent, an amicus curiae
27
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Rule 40

Rule 39, Duties of the clerk.
(a) General provisions. The office of the clerk, with the clerk or a deputy
in attendance, shall be open during business hours on all days except Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays.
(b) The docket; calendar; other records required. The clerk shall keep
a record, known as the docket, in form and style as may be prescribed by the
court and shall enter therein each case. The number of each case shall be
noted on the page of the docket whereon the first entry is made. All papers
filed with the clerk and all process, orders, and opinions shall be entered
chronologically in the docket on the pages assigned to the case. Entries shall
be brief but shall show the nature of each paper filed or decision or order
entered and the date thereof. The clerk shall keep a suitable index of cases
contained in the docket.
The clerk shall keep a minute book in which shall be entered a record of the
daily proceedings of the court. The clerk shall prepare, under the direction of
the presiding judge, a calendar of cases awaiting argument. In placing cases
on the calendar for argument, the clerk shall give preference to appeals in
criminal cases and to appeals and other proceedings entitled to preference by
law.
(c) Notice of orders. Immediately upon the entry of an order or a decision,
the clerk shall serve a notice of entry by mail upon each party to the proceeding, together with a copy of any opinion respecting the order or decision, and
shall make a note in the docket of the mailing. Service on a party represented
by counsel shall be made upon counsel.
(d) Custody of records and papers. The clerk shall have custody of the
records and papers of the court. The clerk shall not permit any original record
or paper to be taken from the clerk's custody, except as authorized by these
rules or the orders or instructions of the court. Original papers transmitted as
the record on appeal or review shall upon disposition of the case be returned to
the court or agency from which they were received. The clerk shall preserve
copies of briefs and attachments, as well as other printed papers filed.

Rule 40. Attorney's or party's certificate; sanctions and
discipline,
(a) Attorney's or party's certificate. Every motion, brief, and other paper
°f a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by a* least one attorney
°f record who is an active member in good standing of the bar of the Supreme
Court of Utah. The attorney shall sign his or her individual name and give his
0r
her business address. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall
8
*gn every motion, brief, and other paper and state the party's address. Except
^hen otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, motions, briefs, or
°ther papers need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The signature
°f an attorney or a party constitutes a certificate that the attorney or the
Party has read the motion, brief, or other paper; that to the best of the attorne
y's or the party's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasona
ble inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a
S°od faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
509
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law; and that it is not interposed for any improper purposes, such as to har
or cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If
motion, brief, or other paper is not signed as required by this rule, it shall h!!
stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the atten
tion of the attorney or the party. If a motion, brief, or other paper is signed i *
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or sua sponte, shall impose up 0n
the person who signed it, a represented party, or both an appropriate sanction
which may include dismissal or affirmance of the appeal, sanctions and disci!
pline under Paragraph (b) of this rule, or an order to pay to the other party 0 r
parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing 0f
the motion, brief, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney fee.
(b) Sanctions and discipline of attorneys and parties. The court may
after reasonable notice and an opportunity to show cause to the contrary and
upon hearing, if requested, take appropriate action against any attorney or
person who practices before it for conduct unbecoming a member of the bar or
a person allowed to appear before the court or for failure to comply with these
rules of the court or order of the court. Any action to suspend or disbar a
member of the Utah State Bar shall be referred to the Ethics and Discipline
Committee of the state bar for proceedings in accordance with the Rules of
Discipline of the State Bar.
(c) Rule does not affect contempt power. This rule shall not be construed to limit or impair the court's inherent and statutory contempt powers.
(d) Appearance of counsel pro hac vice. An attorney who is licensed to
practice before the bar of a sister state or a foreign country but who is not a
member of the bar of the Supreme Court of Utah may appear, upon motion
pro hac vice. Such attorney shall be associated with an active member in good
standing of the bar of this court and shall be subject to the provisions of this
rule and all other provisions of these rules.

510

Index to

3MINISTRATIVE AGENCIE
COMMISSIONS AND COM
[Costs.
Agency appeals, Rule 34
fjleview and enforcement of <
Agencies
Duty to file record, Rule 16
U Applicability of other rules tc
Rule 18
Dockets
Docketing fees, Rule 14.
Fees.
Docketing fees, Rule 14
Statutory fees, Rule 14.
Filing.
Record on review, Rule 16.
Intervention, Rule 14
Notice.
Record on review
Filing, Rule 16.
Petition for review
Contents, Rule 14.
Filing.
Time, Rule 14.
Joint petition, Rule 14.
Service, Rule 14.
Time.
Filing, Rule 14.
Record on review.
Agencies.
Duty to file, Rule 16.
Composition, Rule 15.
Filing.
Duty of agency, Rule 16
Notice, Rule 16.
Time for, Rule 16
What constitutes, Rule ]
Misstatements, Rule 15.
Notice.
Filing, Rule 16.
Omissions, Rule 15.
Service.
Petition for review, Rule 1
AMICUS CURIAE.
- Briefs of, Rule 25.
ANSWERS.
Discretionary appeals.
Interlocutory orders, Rule 5.
Filing, Rule 5
Habeas corpus.
Contents, Rule 20.

372

lTtjlh

<>™ PACIFIC RFPORTKR, 2d SKKIKS

Willis E. ROSENLOF and Linna G. Rosenlof, his wife. Plaintiffs, Respondents and Cross-Appellants,
v.
Ned L. SULLIVAN and the City of St.
George, Defendants, Third-Party Plaintiff, Appellant and Cross-Respondent,
v.
Ben STOUT dba Ben Stout Realty and
Kent Frei, Third-Party Defendants
and Respondents.
No. 18108.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec. 12, 1983.

After city informed purchasers of
home that it could not be used as duplexunder zoning laws, although so constructed, purchasers brought action against vendor, claiming that he had misrepresented
property as duplex, and vendor crossclaimed against real estate agent who had
arranged sale. The Fifth District Court,
Washington County, Robert F. Owens, Circuit Judge, by designation, entered judgment against vendor for both damages and
attorney fees, and both vendor and purchasers appealed. The Supreme Court,
Stewart, J., held that: (1) in light of nature
of claim and evidence presented at trial,
trial court properly instructed jury on
breach of contract, notwithstanding that
purchasers did not specifically raise contract claim in complaint; (2) trial court did
not err in refusing to grant new trial for
jury's alleged mathematical error in awarding damages; (3) vendor could not claim
error as to trial court's response to jury's
request for additional instructions which
was approved by all parties; (4) purchasers
were entitled to attorney fees, including
those incurred on appeal; and (5) purchasers were not entitled to further damage
award to compensate them for cost of converting duplex to single-family rental.
Judgment r^ffirmed;

ca^o remanded

1. Appeal and Error e=>173(l)
Failure of vendor, in trial of purchasers' action alleging his misrepresentation in
sale of house, to raise issue of whether real
estate agent might also have been agent of
purchasers precluded Supreme Court from
addressing such issue on appeal.
2. Trial <3=>252(13)
Where nub of purchasers' action
alleging that vendor misrepresented property as duplex was contract between parties, evidence at trial established contract,
and specific issues alleged by purchasers
under broad allegation of fraud were essentially coterminous with elements of
breach of contract, trial court properly instructed jury concerning breach of contract, notwithstanding that contract claim
was not specifically framed in complaint.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 8(a), 15(b).
3. New Trial e=»143(5)
Trial court properly refused to grant
new trial on basis of affidavit by jury foreman which stated that jury made mathematical error in awarding damages, as juror was allowed to impeach a verdict only
when it was determined by chance or bribery. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 59(a)(2).
4. Appeal and Error <3=>883
Where, upon jury request for additional instructions, trial court consulted all parties, and they agreed to response given by
trial court, defendant could not on appeal
allege error as to response given.
5. Costs <3>172, 252
Where purchasers of house, in action
premised upon vendor's misrepresentations
in sale of house, sufficiently alleged breach
of earnest money agreement and presented
sufficient evidence to sustain jury finding
of breach of contract, prevailing purchasers were entitled to attorney fees, including
those fees incurred on appeal.
6. Fraud <£>60
Where ju r y, in purchasers' act" n
alleging that vendor of house miM"p»*e-tnted property as duplex, returned verdict
against vendor for difference between \al-
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entitled to further damage award to compensate for cost of converting duplex to
single-family rental.

Maxwell Bentley. Mark C. McLachlan,
Salt Lake City, for defendants, third party
plaintiff, appellant and cross-respondent.
John L. Miles, St. George, for plaintiffs,
respondents and cross-appellants.
STEWART. Justice:
This is an
jury verdict
transaction.
and remand
mination of
this appeal.

appeal and cross appeal from a
in a case involving a real estate
We affirm the jury verdict
to the district court for a deterreasonable attorney's fees on

Ned Sullivan, the defendant and the seller of the real estate in dispute, purchased
property in. St. George, Utah, and obtained
a building permit for the construction of a
single family dwelling. He commenced
construction of a duplex even though he
knew that the size of the property was too
small for a duplex under the zoning laws.
During the construction, Kent Frei, a real
estate agent and a third-party defendant
and respondent on this appeal, talked with
the defendant about obtaining a listing on
the property. The defendant refused to
list the property but stated that he would
consider a one-party listing if Mr. Frei had
a specific buyer. When the duplex was
finished, the defendant's two married sons
rented the separate units.
A year after Frei's conversation with the
defendant, Frei talked with the Rosenlofs,
his aunt and uncle, about finding them
some income property in St. George. The
Rosenlofs are the plaintiffs. Frei then contacted the defendant and obtained a oneparty listing. The defendant claims that
during this time he told Frei that the property could not be represented as a duplex,
even though he later signed a document,
written by Frei, which referred to the property as a duplex. Frei denies the assertion

that he was told the property could not be
represented as a duplex. Nevertheless,
Frei knew that the property was too small
for a duplex, but he assumed, without
checking, that the defendant had obtained
a variance. Subsequently, the plaintiffs
inspected the property. At that time the
duplex was occupied and there was no
stairway from the top unit to the lower
unit.
The plaintiffs signed an earnest money
receipt and offer to purchase, and the defendant accepted the offer. Frei acted as
an intermediary during the negotiations,
and thus the plaintiffs never actually met
the defendant. Neither the earnest money
receipt nor the listing indicated that the
property was a duplex.
After purchasing the property, the plaintiffs continued to rent to the defendant's
sons. Five months later one of the sons
moved out. When the new tenant went to
the city utility department to change the
billing, the city informed the plaintiffs that
the property could not be used as a duplex.
The plaintiffs immediately applied for a
variance, but the application was denied.
Furthermore, it was impossible to purchase
more 'and to bring the property into compliance with the zoning.
After failing to obtain a variance, the
plaintiffs brought this action against the
defendant claiming that the defendant had
misrepresented the property as a duplex.
The plaintiffs asked for the difference in
the value of the property as a duplex and
the value as a single dwelling home and for
attorney's fees, as provided for in the earnest money agreement.
The defendant cross-claimed against the
real estate agent Frei and his broker Ben
Stout. The defendant claimed that Frei
had exceeded his authority in representing
the property as a duplex and that he had
breached his obligation to the plaintiffs by
not checking the records to make sure the
property could be lawfully used as a duplex, when Frei knew the property was too
small for such use.
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The jury returned a verdict against the
defendant for $18,000, the difference between the value of the property as a single
family dwelling rental home and the value
of the property as a two family rental
home. Plaintiffs were also awarded $4,000
attorney's fees.
On appeal, the defendant argues that a
new trial should be granted because the
evidence and law do not support a finding
that the plaintiffs reasonably relied on the
representation that the property was a duplex. The defendant argues that the plaintiffs could not reasonably have relied upon
the false representation because (1) Frei
knew the lot was too small for a duplex; (2)
Frei was actually the plaintiffs' agent, not
the defendant's (or Frei was a dual agent
for both the plaintiffs and defendant); (3)
Frei should not have assumed a variance
had been obtained, (4) as plaintiffs' agent,
Frei had a luty to lmestigate the matter
himself and disclose to the plaintiffs the
smallness of the lot and the results of his
investigation; (a) the plaintiffs are bound
bv Fivfs ':nowledtre, omi^Mons and negligence because of V\ \\ failure to do so;
and (6) plamtiffs had no right to relv on the
i dse representations because Frei's knowledge was imputed to the plaintiffs
Ker to all these contentions is the d^iendant's theorv that Fnn was an agent of
the buyers (the plaintiffs!, even if he were
also an agent of the seller (the defendant).
Mthowh there was some evidence to support the theory that Frei w i s an agent for
the buyers, the defendant did not propose
an instruction on that theory. The defendant objected only to three instructions
which focused solely on an agency relationship between Frei and the seller.
[1] The failure of t l e defendant to raise
in the trial court the issue of whether Frei
might also have been an agent of the buyers precludes us from addressing that issue
on appeal. E.g., Park City Utah Corp. v.
Ensign Co, Utah, 5S6 P 2d 446 (1978); In
re Estate of Ekker, 19 Utah 2d 414, 432
P 2d 45 (1967)
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[2] The defendant next argues that the
trial court erred by instructinc: the jury
that
[i]f you find that the existing \ iolation of
the St. George City Zoning Ordinance
renders the title to the property unmarketable as a duplex, and if you also find
that the property was represented as a
duplex, then the Seller has breached his
agreement in the Earnest Mone\ to convey marketable title and [is] answerable
in damages, including attorne\ \ fees.
He contends that the instruction is erroneous because the plaintiffs only alleged
fraud in their complaint and not breach of
contract.
Under Utah R.Civ.P. 8(a), " 'a pleader is
required only to make a short and plain
statement of his claim.' " Blackham
v.
Snelgrove, 3 Utah 2d 157, 160, 2S0 P.2d
453, 454 (1955), quoting Burr v. Child*, 1
Utah 2d 199, 204, 265 P 2d 3S3, 3^7 (1953).
"[A] complaint is required only to 4 *
give the opposing paity fair notice of the
nature and basis or grounds of the claim
and a general ind : cation of th** t\pe of
litigation involved.' " Id. 3 TTtah 2d at 160,
^ 0 P2d at 455, quoting 1 Barron cv Holt/otf, federal
Practice and
Pujcedui'
*> 255 at 431-34 (1960) The parties at*
"on^Med to . . . nonce of the issues rai^d
and an opportunity to meet them ' Che
neu r. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205 211, 3M
P >i> Ni 91 (1963) See also \\tlha,>< <
St •*" Farm Insurance Co, Utah. t>~<' p JM
J' ' °70-71 (1982> which d i s c u s e s Hl„cl>
tuiPK Uurr, and ' hei>ey.
\hhough the of nntiffs did nof aPege
breach of contract claim in their conusant
th< nub of the whole litigation was th^
contract between the parties Indeed, the
comprint alleged;
[Tjhe Plaintiffs made an offer to huv tV»^
luplex on August 27, 1979 and
. *aid
offer was accepter by Ned L Sullivan on
September 3, 1979. Attached to th'*
complaint as Exhibit "A" is a copy of the
"Earnest Mone\ Receipt and Offer To
Purchase" which sets forth the agreement between the parties and which is
incorporated herem by this reference
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. . . Defendant Ned L. Sullivan should
be required to pav Plaintif r s damages of
$40,000 or such other amount as may be
proved at trial for the difference between
the value of the property as a single
family rental home and the value of the
property if it had been a duplex rental as
represented, said difference being the
Plaintiffs loss of the benefit of their bargain.
. . . Defendant Ned L. Sullivan should
be required to pay Plaintiffs reasonable
attorney fees as provided by lines 47-48
of Exhibit "A" [the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase] in such
amount as may be proved at trial.
Even though a contract claim was not
adequately framed in the complaint, Utah
R.Civ.P. 15(b) permits a complaint to be
amended "at any time, even after judgment," to conform with the evidence. The
evidence at trial established the contract,
the intent of the parties regarding the contract, and the defendant's breach of the
contract. No objection was made by the
defendant to any of this evidence. The
defendant had ample opportunity to
present evidence showing that there was
no breach. Moreover, the specific issues
alleged under the broad allegation of fraud
were essentially coterminous with the elements of breach of contract, except perhaps as to whether Frei was a dual agent.
Nevertheless, that was a central point in
Sullivan's case on either theory. On this
appeal, defendant points to no defenses he
would or could have presented on the contract issue had a contract case been properly pleaded. Nor does defendant showr prejudice of any kind.
[3] The defendant also argues that the
trial court erred in not granting a new trial
because the jury allegedly made a mathematical error in awarding damages. The
jury foreman stated in an affidavit filed in
support of defendant's motion for new trial, that:
fljn determining the amount of damages
to be awarded the plaintiffs against the

defendant Ned L. Sullivan, a mistake*
was made in the sum of five thousand
dollars. This resulted from the mistaken
suggestion that the difference between
the value of the house as a duplex and as
a single-family residence was $18,000.00,
which was arrived [atj by deducting the
value of a single-family residence of .>f>5,000 from the value of the property as a
duplex winch was $78,000.00.
. . . Shortly after the erroneous verdict
was given to the Court, I realized that an
error had been made and I contacted my
attorney, . . . and I requested that he
communicate the information to the respective attorneys and/or parties involved, which was done.
Rule 59(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure authorizes a jury verdict to be
impeached by the affidavit of a juror based
on certain narrowly defined grounds of
jury misconduct. This Court has interpreted Rule 59(a)(2) to allow an affidavit by a
juror to impeach the verdict only when the
verdict was determined by chance or bribery. Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, Utah, 667 P.2d
598 (1983); Smith v. Baniett, 17 Utah 2d
240, 408 P.2d 709 (1965). See Johnson v.
Simons, Utah, 551 P.2d 515 (1976); Stringham v. Broderick,
Utah, 529 P.2d 425
(1974).
The reasons for limiting the circumstances when a juror's affidavit may be used to
impeach his verdict were explained in
Wheat v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., . 122
Utah 418, 428-29, 250 P.2d 932, 937 (1952):
To permit litigants to get jurors to sign
affidavits or testify to matters discussed
in connection with their functions as jurors would open the door to inquiry into
all manner of things which a losing litigant might consider improper: misconceptions of evidence or law, offers of
settlement, personal experiences, prejudice against litigants or their causes or
the classes to which they belong. It
would be an interminable and totally impracticable process. Such post mortems
would be productive of no end of mischief and render service as a juror unbearable.
If jurors were so circum-
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scribed in their deliberations, it is likely
that judge and counsel would have to be
present in the jury room attempting to
monitor and regulate their thought and
discussions into approved channels. Fortunately, jurors are under no such limitation, but are allowed freedom in their
deliberations.
[41 The defendant also argues that the
trial court erred in denying his motion for a
new trial for failing to give the jury additional instructions after it transmitted the
following question to the trial judge:
If we conclude that there has been
negligence on both parties, Ned Sullivan
and Ben Stout Realty, can we divide the
liability between the defendants in each
case?
The response formulated to the above
question was:
The question seems to relate to the
second case. Under the legal theory involved in the second case, you should not
divide liability, but shouid find for one or
the other. Perhaps a re-reading of your
instructions and verd'jts would assist
you.
The defendant, for the first time on appeal, argues that the trial court should
have given an instruction renting to comparative negl'gence. In determining how
to respond to the jury's question, the trial
court consulted all the parties, and they
agreed to the above response. Defendant's
contention is meritless.
151 Of1 fondant's final contention is that
the trial court erred in instructing the jury
that under the earnest money contract, the
prevailing party would be entitled to attorney's fees. Since we have already decided
that the plaintiffs did allege breach of the
earnest money agreement and presented
sufficient evidence to sustain a jury finding
of breach of contract, the plaintiffs are
entitled to attorney's fees.
Plaintiffs seek reasonable attorney's fees
expended for this appeal. In recent cases
we have adopted as a "rule of law that a
contract provision for payment of attorney's fees includes attorney's fees incurred

on appeal as well as at trial, if the action is
brought to enforce the contract . . . . "
Management
Services Corp. v. Development Associates, Utah, GIT P.2d 40b, 409
(1980). Accord Alexander v. Brown, Utah,
646 P.2d 692 (1982); Nielsen v. Chin-Hsien
Wang, Utah, 613 P.2d f)12 (1980). See also
Edwards' Pet Supply v. Ben f lei/, Utah,
652 P.2d 889, 890 (1982). Accordingly, we
remand for a determination of reasonable
attorney's fees for this appeal.
[61 The plaintiffs also claim that the
damage award should be increased by
$4,027.00 to compensate the plaintiffs for
the cost of converting the duplex to a single family rental. The jury verdict is dispositive of the damage claims in this case.
The judgment is affirmed and the case
remanded to the trial court for a determination of reasonable attorney's fees on appeal. Costs to respondents.
HAUL, C.J., and OAKS, HOWE and
DURHAM, JJ., concur.

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Joseph Scott HAMRLIN, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 1S705.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec. 13, 1983.

Defendant was convicted in the Second
District Court, Weber County, Ronald 0.
Hyde. J., of automobile homicide. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that: (1) under rule that spe"ifL- statute controls general one, and in
view of primary responsibility of court to
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\bcock and Brown,
k and Brown filed
amended complaints.
I an order of consoli> stipulation, on Octo[985, more than two
r plaintiffs amended
Kelly filed a motion
int to include as deld Brown. After a
r 23, 1985, the court
elly argues the trial
r her motion to amend
R.Civ.P. 15(a) states:
:1 his pleading once as
at any time before a
y is served or, if the
which no responsive
od and the action has
jon the trial calendar,
t at any time within 20
ved. Otherwise a parpleading only by 'leave
•ihten consent of the
d leave shall be freely
e so requires,
motion to amend, the
do "whether the opposit to unavoidable prejuissue adjudicated for
10 to prepare." Bckins
t,th, 1>(U P.2d 45o, 464
it a clear abuse of diswill not disturb a trial
motion to amend. Gir0 P.2d 24"> tLtah 1«S3).
s the amendment would
udice to Bubcock and
ey were aware of her
.n two years and particiby attending her deposiiey attended plaintiffs
c and Brown did not parr their own questions.
: an action against other
require a defendant to
in anticipation of plain;ome future time to join
rtv. See Randall v. Sal-

vation Army, 100 Nev. 4?1G, 686 P.2d 241
(1984) (consolidation does not necessarily
render litigants parties to each other's
suits).
The case had been pending for over three
years when, just prior to trial, Mrs. Kelly
moved to amend her complaint. A hearing
on the motion was held one week before
trial was set to begin. Babcock and Brown
were prepared to defend against five personal injury claims. That does not mean
they could be required to defend, on short
notice, a wrongful death action of a different plaintiff. If the trial court had granted
the motion so close to trial, it may have
required a continuance of the trial which, in
turn, could have prejudiced the consolidated cases.
We conclude the trial court acted within
its discretion in denying Mrs. Kelly's motion to amend. The court's order is affirmed. Costs to Babcock and Brown.
BILLINGS and GREENr ODD, JJ.,
concur.
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Cindy HEATS, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
COMMERCIAL SECURITY HANK,
Defendant and Respondent.
No. 8f>n:]22~CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Dec. 15, 1987.
Patron brought action against owner
of parking terrace for injuries sustained
when she slipped on ice on parking terrace.
The Second District Court, Weber County,
David E. Roth, J., found that owner was
not negligent, and patron appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Billings, J., held that: (1)
finding that owner was not negligent wras
supported by evidence that patron knew

that uncovered level of parking terrace was
icy, patron was not required to park on
uncovered level, and patron was first patron to arrive at parking terrace that day,
and (2) instruction that patron had duty to
foresee plainly visible danger and avoid it
was not improper.
Affirmed.

1. New Trial <S=>72(1)
Jury's verdict which is subject of motion for new trial will be reversed only if
evidence supporting it was completely lacking or so slight and unconvincing as to
make verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust.
2. Appeal and Error e=>930(l)
Appellate court reviews jury's verdict
in light most favorable to prevailing party,
and accords evidence presented and every
reasonable inference fairly drawn from evidence same degree of deference.
3. Negligence <s=>48
In determining whether business invitor w:\s negligent, inquiry is whether owner or its employees knew, or in exercise of
ordinary care should have known, that dangerous condition existed, and whether sufficient time elapsed such that corrective
action could have been taken to remedy
situation.
4. Negligence ®=»32(2.8)
Property owners are not insurers for
safety of their business invitees.
5. Negligence <>^131(1)
Finding that owner of parking terrace
was not liable for injuries sustained when
patron slipped in parking lot was supported
by evidence that patron knew that parking
terrace was icy, patron was not required to
park on uncovered level of parking terrace,
and patron was first patron of parking lot
that day.
6. Trial <3=>344
Affidavit by juror may be used to impeach verdict only when verdict was determined by chance or bribery. Rules Civ.
Proc, Rule 59(a)(2).
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7. Trial c=>2*5, 295(1)
Jury instructions are read in their entire context and given meaning in accordance with ordinary and usual import of
language as it would be understood by Jay
jurors.
8. Negligence <3=67
Plaintiff alleging negligence, acting in
reasonably prudent manner, has duty to
foresee danger, and to avoid it; if plaintiff
fails to see or sees but fails to avoid danger, then plaintiff acted negligently. U.C.
A. 1953, 78-27-37, 78-27-38.
Robert A. Echard (argued), Gridley, Echard & Ward, Ogden, for plaintiff and appellant.
Donald J. Purser (argued), J. Angus Edwards, Purser, Overhok & Okazaki, Salt
Lake City, for defendant and respondent.
Before BILLINGS, GREENWOOD
and BENCH, JJ.
OPINION
HU LINGS, Judge:
. Plaintiff Cindy Deats '"Deats") appeals
from a jury verdict that Commercial Security oank ("CoB"') was not negligent in the
maintenance <jf its parkin? terrace. Deats
eiaims that the jury's verdict was contrary
U> the evidence and manifestly unjust, and
that a jury instruction misstated the law,
constituting prejudicial error. We affirm.
I..
FACTS
At 7:05 a.m. on Monday, February 27,
19v>i, Deats parked on the uncovered
fourth level of a parking structure owned
by CSB. Arriving before sunrise, Deats
was the first patron of the parking lot
After parking her car, Deats, while walking towards the exit stairway, decided to
move her car because she thought another
car might slide into it. While returning to
move her car to a safer location, Deats
slipped and fell on the ice, hurting her left
knee. After she had moved her car, Deats

observed a person throwing sand or salt on
the previously unsanded parking surface.
Deats filed a negligence action against CSB
to recover for the personal injuries she
sustained from the fall.
The case was submitted to the jury after
the trial judge read thirty-nine instructions,
including instructions on comparative negligence, the duty of care required of business invitors, and the duty of care required
of a plaintiff in a negligence action.
The jury found that CSB was not negligent. Deats subsequently filed a motion
for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, alleging: (1)
the jury's verdict was contrary to the evidence and manifestly unjust, and (2) instruction twenty-five was a misstatement
of the law, constituting prejudicial error.
The trial court denied Deats' motion for
a new trial and this appeal ensued.
II.
THE JURY^ VERDICT
11,2] A jury's verdict which is the subject of a motion for a new trial will be
reversed only if the evidence supporting it
We: ; completely lacking or so slight and
unconvincing as to make ihe verdici plainly
unreasonable and unjust. Royloncc v.
Ru'ce, 737 P.2d 232. 284 (Utah Ct.App.
lbr-'i). We review the jury's verdict in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party, and accord the evidence presented and
every reasonable inference fairly drawn
from the evidence the same degree of deference. Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170,
172 (Utah 1983); sec Jacobsvn Construction Co. v. Strueto-Lite En pi nee ring.
Inc.. 619 p.2d 306, *US (Utah Uisu).
[3. I] In determining whether r business invitor was negligent, the inquiry is
whether the owner or its employees knew,
or in the exercise of ordinary care should
have known, that a dangerous condition
existed, and whether sufficient time
elapsed such that corrective action could
have been taken to remedy the situation.
Marti7i v. Safeway Stores Inc., 565 P.2d
1139, 1140-41 (Utah 1977). Property own-
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or "*(V not insurer^ fo** f^(l safety of their
bu^uo^s invitees. Id.
[5] Applying this legal principle, the evidence, viewed in a light favorable to the
jury's verdict, adequately supports the verdict that CSB was not negligent in the
operation and maintenance of its parking
terrace. Testimony revealed that CSB was
servicing the fourth level of the parking
terrace at approximately the time of Deats'
early arrival. The jury could have reasonab'\ concluded that sufficient time had not
elopsed since the ice formed such that CSB
could have remedied thr: situation.
In finding th?* CSB wa« not at all negligent <be jury necessarily found that Deats
was 100 percent negligent. The evidence,
again viewed in a light favorable to the
ju>w's verdict, supports the jury's determination that Deats was 100 percent negligent. First, Deats admitted she knew the
uncovered fourth level of the parking terrace was icv. Second, x>ats conceded she
did nc have to park on the fourth level.
Ind*1* a. on a prior occasion, Deats parked
on an adjacent street when she knew the
fo^r*'-1 level parking su r tac° would be icy.
1* 'd, Deats arrived b^< re sunrise. Given
th^ ^ " M I V of th. c rcur^tances, we find
the m -v s verdict rea^K.ole and mst.

by causing the jury to erroneously find
that CSB was not negligent. Deats contends instruction twenty-five constitutes an
"assumption of risk" instruction, which is
not permissible under Utah's comparative
negligence statutes. Utah Code \nn.
§§ 78-27-37, -38 (1987). We disagree.
Instruction twenty-five reads:
Ordinarily, a plaintiff in any action has
the duty of seeing and avoiding, if reasonable, a hazard which is plainly visible,
and if the plaintiff [unreasonably] failed
to do so, then the plaintiff is negligent
either in failing to look or in failing to
heed what he or she saw.
Deats urges us to interpret this instruction as meaning that Deats is barred from
recovery if she failed to avoid the icy conditions of the parking surface, regardless of
whether she exercised reasonable care and
regardless of whether { SB exercised reasonable care. If this interpretation is correct, then Deats conterds the jury would
not apportion the negligence between the
parries \Ve reject Det is' construction of
this instruction

[71 In ;truct'ons are read in their ent're
conT.j\t and given meaning in accordance
wi ^ U>e ordinary and u^ual import of the
lane . ge as it would be understood by lav[ P Doats attorn*^? to imreach the
jurors. Branson v. Strong, 17 Ltah '.id
,?
y rv' \erd- *t \v *»hid t s of two jurors.
361 7)7, 412 P.2d 451, 4.52-53 (196*>) Unchn > ing they mi^nnrifrstood the trial
der Utah's comparative negligence st itute,
T
com- s instni* ons L »> weh-established,
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38 (19^71, and its
ho-v.^pr. 'hat Rule W* e>) o' the Utah
accompanying definite^ ''ounterpart, Utah
1
R"' - (»»" C-vil Prop* dure < iowF an affidavit
Crde Ann. § 78-27-3 < iH*87), the concept
r\ •> i^or to inr>pach the T'ird.<t only when
of contributory negligence include^ what
j
tin* ^ Taict \\a-> d^t rmined by chance or
was lormeHy termed - condary ? sumpV"*n
R^senlnf v. StJhvan, 6~6 P.2d
tion <»{ nA" "the unrK^onabio ei-counur^«J, 37 "> (Utah 1\'^'A\ UQ: altera:^ to mv
ing or a known an a appreciated risk"
p*MtJ> the verdict by w- v or affidavit is
Mc<, n' v. b a rton L' %
, - < r <£ In y fly a,- e
,M
} « ^ contrary to law. "'""he jurors' misunCo., 'Vil p.^d 865, V70 (Utah 11-U, we
,#
dei- »pdmg of ihe court's instruction is not
Jrm^en Constr Cv , , 1 9 P 2d at .'-10 312.
one of the narrowlv defined grounds availMore specifically,
able under Rule 5<Vp)(2).
the reasonableness of plaintiffs ^nrhi^t
in confronting a knoun or unknown risk
III.
created by defendant's negligence will
[VQTPTTTIQN TWCNTY-FIVE
basically be determined under principles
DeaK' second issue on appeal is that
of contributory negligence. Attention
i *rv ", n twenty-f've nrsstated the law
should be focused on whether a reasonrwr-ixJipfr n nl-»;rtiffs duty of care, thereably prudent man in the exercise of due
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spite his knowledge of it, and if so, Hank.
whether he would hatre conducted himBENCH and GREENWOOD. ,U,
self in the manner in whic*» the pliintiff
concur.
acted in light of all the surrounding circumstances, including the appreciated
J^\
risk
J <*ob*<n Constr. r01 619 P 2d at 312.
[81 Tt is well-settled that a pontiff, acting in a reasonanbly prudent manner, has a
duty to foresee a danger, Moore v. Burton
Lumber & Hardware Co., 621 P 2d at 870,
particularly one that is plainly visible, and
avoid it. Hindmarsh v. O.P. Skaggs Foodliner, 21 Utah 2d 413, 416-17, 446 P.2d 410,
412 (1968). If a plaintiff fails to see or
sees but fails to avoid the danger, then the
plaintiff acted negligently. See Pollesche
v K-Mnrt Enterprises of Utah, Inc., 520
P2d 200 '203 (Utah 1974) (plaintiff who
s^es ai'd ignores the danger is guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of
law); Hindmarsh. 21 Utah 2d 413 at 417,
4i<> P2d at 412; Whitman v. W.T. Grant
Co., 16 Utah 2d 81, 83, 395 P.2d 918, 920
(1964) (plaintiff can be negligent either in
failing to look or in failing to heed what he
or she saw).
Instruction twenty-five, when read together with all of the other instructions
given on negligence, is a correct statement
of a plaintiffs duty in a negligence action.
Nowhere in instruction twenty-five, nor in
any of tne other remaining thirty-eight instructions, did the icvA court intimate that
if Deats was negligent then she was precluded from recovering. On the contrary,
the instructions, when read in their entirety, adequately informed the jury of CSB's
duty of care as a property owner, Deats'
duty of care, and raost importantly, of the
procedure by which the jury must apportion negligence if v ^th parties were found
to have acted negligently.
The frial court properly denied Deats'
motion for a new trial. The evidence supporting the jury's findings was ample and
convincing and t^e verdict, therefore, was
not unreasonable nor "njust. Roy lance,
:•>" p ^ vi ';•*'• ' T< n v. TrujWo, 657
p o i ,«>/, - <T> n , 1<K*2).

William Ray GAGON, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY, a/k/a State
Farm Insurance Companies, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 860137-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Dec. 18, 1987.
Insured brought action against automobile insurer for payment of claim ana
bad faith refusal to pay claim. The District Court, John A. Rokich, J., Erected
v?roict in favor of insurer on bid :V/r
i/sue. Insured appealed. The Court of
Appeal., Greenwood, J., held that evidence
created jury question whether insurer re
fused to pay claim in bad faith.
Reversed f-nd remanded
1. insurance e=^2.12(2)
Ev;dence created jury question* whether insured shou i have known that t
pump was damag°d after metal object iV
from pickup true; and struck underside c:
car, whether insurer fairly evaluated c1 > .i.
for damage to encrire as resuk of i>ontuu
tioning oil pump, and whether insurer rehired to pay in bad faith.
2. ^retrial Proo Jure 0 7 5 2
Evidence of punitive damage ,T * ''
v
admissible in mound's act" n ar; '
*>*
r
er or payment » f claim ?nd « . i .:i »i r
fusal to pay cl ».in, where uu g.» suited m
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fit to testify in his own behalf, and the jury
was not obligated to believe his testimony.
Defendant points to the lack of direct
testimony that the automobile was operational at the time of its theft. Inasmuch as
it was uncontradicted that the automobile
was stolen between 8:00 and 10:30 p. m. and
was observed being driven into defendant's
shed at 11:30 p. m. on the same evening, the
jury was at liberty to infer that it was
operational at the time of the theft.
Defendant also contends that the only
evidence connecting him to the theft was
his possession of the recently stolen automobile. However, the record contains other
corroborative evidence, not the least of
which is the following: 1) defendant's own
explanation of his possession, 2) his concealment of the automobile and partial dismantlement, 3) his false claim of ownership and
evidence of title, and 4) his admission to
Detective Leonard of his knowledge that
the automobile was stolen. 14
The conviction and judgment are
firmed.

af-

HOWE, J., and CALVIN GOULD, District Judge, concur.
STEWART, J., concurs in the result.
MAUGHAN, C. J., does net participate
herein; GOULD, District Judge, sat.
CROCKETT, J., heard the arguments,
but retired before the opinion was written.

Paul T. MOORE, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
BURTON LUMBER & HARDWARE
COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 16672.
Supreme Court of Utah.
May 22, 1981.
Defendant appealed from judgment of
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
David K. Winder, J., based on jury's special
verdict which found defendant liable for
personal injuries sustained by plaintiff
while operating a radial arm saw on defendant's business premises. The Supreme
Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) although
trial court should have instructed that there
was no duty to warn an invitee of an obvious danger so as to have avoided any possible misunderstanding, failure to do so was
harmless; (2) since duty of plaintiff and
consequences of a breach thereof were explained to jury in appropriate language,
there was no error in not giving an instruction on r. condary assumption of risk in
addition to a contributory negligence instruction; and (3) there was substantial evidence in record to support jury's findings,
and thus trial court did not err in failing to
instruct jury that, as a matter of law, plaintiff was negligent and that the negligence
was sole cause of the injury, or alternatively that it waG a proximate cause of the
injury.
Affirmed.
Hall, J., dissented and filed opinion in
which Crockett, J., concurred.
1. Appeal and Error <&=> 1068(5)
Products Liability <s=*96
In action to recover for injuries sustained when plaintiff was using radial arm

14. See State v. Kinsey, 11 Utah 348. 295 P. 247
(1931); State v. Thomas, 121 Utah 639, 244
P.2d653 (1952).
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saw on defendant's business premises, trial
court, in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding by jury, should have instructed
that there was no duty to warn an invitee
of an obvious danger, but failure to do so
was harmless, because, in light of specific
findings of jury that plaintiff was negligent
but that his negligence was not a proximate
cause of the injury and that defendant was
negligent and that its negligence was a
proximate cause of the injury, there was no
reasonable likelihood that there would have
been a result more favorable to defendant
had the instruction been given as requested.
2. Trial <s=>358
A jury's answers to special interrogatories must, if at all possible, be read harmoniously.
3. Negligence <s=>67, 105
A plaintiff's failure to foresee a danger
which a reasonable person acting in a prudent manner would have foreseen is "designated negligent conduct," whereas "assumption of risk" designates conduct of a
person who unreasonably takes a known
and appreciated risk.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
4. Negligence <3=>105
"Assumption of risk," as that term is
used in statute providing that contributory
negligence shall not bar recovery in a negligence action, is a voluntary and unreasonable exposure to a known danger. U.C.A.
1953, 78-27-37.
5. Negligence <s=>97
"Secondary assumption of risk," which
is the unreasonable encountering of a
known and appreciated risk and in reality
an aspect of contributory negligence, is
treated in same manner as contributory
negligence for purpose of apportioning
fault under comparative negligence statute.
U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
1. Deal's lumber was purchased out of state and
stored at Intermountain Lumber ("Intermoun-

6. Trial <s=>260(8)
In action to recover for injuries sustained when plaintiff was using radial arm
saw on defendant's business premises, there
was no error in not giving an instruction on
secondary assumption of risk in addition to
a contributory negligence instruction since
duty of plaintiff and consequences of a
breach thereof were explained to jury in
appropriate language; overruling Rigtrup
v. Strawberry Water Users Ass'n., 563 P.2d
1247, U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37.
7. Products Liability <s=>85, 96
There was substantial evidence in record to support findings of jury that defendant was liable for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff while operating radial
arm saw on defendant's business premises,
and thus trial court correctly refused to
instruct jury that, as a matter of law, plaintiff was negligent and that the negligence
was sole cause of the injury, or alternatively that it was a proximate cause of the
injury.

Raymond M. Berry, Brucett Jensen, Salt
Lake City, for defendant and appellant.
W. Eugene Hansen, Ralph L. Dewsnup,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.
STEWART, Justice:
Defendant appeals from a judgment
based on a jury's special verdict which
found defendant liable for personal injuries
sustained by plaintiff while operating a radial arm saw on defendant's business premises.
During approximately a two-year period,
from June 1973 to May 1975, plaintiff supervised a large building project for Deal
Development Company ("Deal") in Salt
Lak? City. Deal had an open account with
defendant which was used in charging
hardware items purchased for the project.1
Shortly before noon on May 1, 1975,
plaintiff and one Buddy Prince, a fellow
tain"), several blocks away from defendant's
business premises.
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employee of Deal, drove to defendant's
business premises in plaintiff's pickup
truck. Their purpose was to buy some
hardware items and to ask permission to
use defendant's radial arm saw to cut several two-by-fours into blocks to be used in
enclosing air-conditioning ducts.
While
Prince gathered the hardware items, plaintiff went to the front desk to seek permission to use the radial arm saw. There is
substantial conflict in the evidence as to
what thereafter transpired. 2
Plaintiff apparently spoke with defendant's office manager who quoted plaintiff a
price per cut for the use of the saw, but no
set price was agreed upon. Plaintiff testified that thereafter someone told him to
check with the yardmen and that if the saw
was not being used, it would be all right for
him to use it.
Plaintiff went out into the yard and told
a .yardman by the flame of Jessie that he
had been given permission to use the saw.
Jessie led plaintiff to the saw shed, where
plaintiff offered to give Jessie a six-pack of
beer if he would change the blade before
plaintiff got back from Intermountain
Lumber with the lumber to be cut. Jessie
allegedly agreed, and plaintiff and Prince
then drove to Intermountain where they
picked up the two-by-fours they planned to
cut into blocks.
Plaintiff claims they
stopped at a small store where they bought
the beer promised to Jessie. They then
returned to defendant's business premises
and entered through the back gate.
Plaintiff entered the saw shed and noticed that the saw had been reset from the
ripping position to the cross-cut position.
He then measured the length he wanted to
cut and drove a nail into the table for use
as a gauge so that he wou)d not ha ye to
measure each cut separately.
Plaintiff
started the saw and cut the first two-byfour by placing its end against the nail
gauge, pulling the saw toward him and
returning it, then knocking the cut block
2. Defendant and its employees dispute plaintiffs claim that he received permission to use
the saw. For the purposes of this appeal, we
view the facts in the light most favorable to the

out of the way, and moving his two-by-four
up to the nail gauge to repeat the process.
This procedure was following approximately seven to nine times.
When he finished cutting the first twoby-four, plaintiff pushed the saw back to its
return position and went to the end of the
table to get the second two-by-four. He
took hold of the second two-by-four with
both hands and moved it along the table in
front of a one-by-four which served as a
guide. Plaintiff momentarily directed his
attention to the nail gauge on the table to
make sure the two-by-four abutted it, when
suddenly the saw cut his hand. Before he
could pull his hand away from the saw, his
thumb and his index and middle fingers of
his right hand were severed, and his remaining two fingers were severely cut.
There is no evidence that the blade of the
saw cut through the board and then into
plaintiff's fingers, or that plaintiff either
manually pulled the saw into a cutting position, or that he moved his hand into the
saw, as is speculated by the dissent. Nor is
there evidence that the manner in which
plaintiff placed his hand on the board was
improper.
The testimony at trial included evidc ice.
that the radial arm saw had been in use on
defendant's premises for over thirty year^
without an accident. There was a sign
hanging on the wall opposite the saw which
read in large yellow letters, ' T o r Use of
Authorized Operator Only." Plaintiff testified to having had experience operating
such saws, and, although he admitted that
su-.h saws are, by their very nature, extremely dangerous, he claimed he was competent to opt rat 3 the saw without a\v instruction or assistance.
The evidence indicated that the saw vas
equinped with a hood guard which serves to
control direction of the sawdust produced
by cutting wood; it, is not designed to be a
safety guard but could be rotated down
against most thicknesses of lumber. Plainverdict. Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives v.
Meibos, Utah, 6'Jl P.2d 798 (1980); Rod&e-s v.
Hansen, Utah, 5S0 P.2d 233 (1978).
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tiffs expert testified that the hood guard
was not an adequate blade guard, that is, a
guard designed to prevent the operator of
the saw from coming into contact with the
saw blade. International standards for
blade guards require that such guards permit no more than 3/s inch clearance between
the bottom of the guard and the saw table
when the blade is exposed. Even if the
hood guard were rotated down, once the
lumber was cut the clearance between the
bottom of the guard and the table would
exceed % inch. Thus, even had plaintiff
rotated the hood guard down so that it
would contact the two-by-four being cut,
the guard would not have prevented plaintiffs hand from being drawn into the blade
of the saw.
In addition, plaintiffs expert testified
that the saw in question was not equipped
with a system to prevent the spinning blade
from creeping forward from its rest position. A large spinning blade will creep
forward unless it is restrained, either mechanically or by gravity. In a mechanical
restraint system a spring or a pulley and
weight system holds the blade in the maximum rearward position. The same result
can be obtained by simply tilting the front
of the table slightly so that gravity keeps
the blade in the proper rest position. In the
opinion of plaintiffs expert, the lack of
proper blade guards and a blade restraining
system rendered the saw in question "defective and unreasonably dangerous."
. A special verdict was returned finding
both plaintiff and defendant negligent, but,
significantly, the jury also found plaintiffs
negligence not to have been a cause of the
injury. The jury also found that plaintiff
was a business invitee and not a licensee or
trespasser and assessed damages in the
amount of $144,892. The court entered
judgment in that amount against defendant. Defendant's motion for a new trial
was denied, and this appeal followed.
[1] Defendant's first claim on appeal is
that the trial court prejudicially erred in
refusing to instruct the jury that there is no
duty to warn a business invitee of an obvious danger. Specifically, defendant argues

that because one instruction informed the
jury that there was no duty to warn licensees of obvious dangers, the failure to give
such an instruction with respect to invitees
may have led the jury to believe erroneously that defendant should have warned
plaintiff as to obvious dangers. Defendant
also claims that the trial court erred in
failing to instruct on the defense of assumption of risk and in refusing to submit
that defense to the jury for a finding in the
special verdict.
There are of course certain risks which
anyone of adult age must be taken to appreciate. Wold v. Ogden City, 123 Utah
270, 258 P.2d 453 (1953); Prosser, Handbook
of the Law of Torts (4th ed.) § 61 p. 394, see
also § 68 p. 448. It has long been held that
a property owner has no obligation to warn
an invitee of dangers which are known to
the invitee or which are so obvious and
apparent that he may reasonably be expected to discover them. Defendant specifically
contends that the evidence supported its
theory that the dangers were obvious and
that the defendant therefore had no duty to
warn plaintiff of such dangers.
Under the circumstances of this case, the
trial cuurt should have instructed that th< re
was no duty to warn an invitee of an obvious dnnger so as to have avoided any possible misunderstanding. Steele v. Denver <fe
Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, 16
Utah 2d 127, 396 P.2J 751 (1964); see ai;o
ElierLson v. Dansie, Utah, 576 P.2d 867
(1978). Nevertheless, the failure to do so
was harmless.
There was no evidence that the specific
dangers for which the defendant could be
held responsible and which could have
caused the injury—the lack of certain blad**
guards and the creeping of the saw—were
such obvious and common hazards as to be
apparent to a layman or one with plaintiff's
background. The evidence which did relate
to the obviousness of the danger of the saw
went to its inherent danger rather than the
specific dangers created by the lack of
blade guards and the tendency of the saw
to creep forward. As to these defects,
there was expert testimony that the saw
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was defective and unreasonably dangerous.
But there was no testimony that the creeping was obvious to one in plaintiff's shoes or
that the plaintiff knew or should have
known about the availability of the blade
guards.
[2] In answer to a special interrogatory,
the jurors specifically found that plaintiff
was negligent, but that his negligence was
not a proximate cause of the injury. On
the other hand, the jury specifically found
that defendant was negligent and that its
negligence was a proximate cause of the
injury. To accept defendant's theory that
the injury resulted from the failure to warn
or correct an obvious danger would result in
a finding that plaintiff's negligence was a
proximate cause of the injury—in direct
conflict with the jury's finding on proximate cause. The jury's responses to the
special interrogatories are consistent only
on the proposition that the injury resulted
from a nonobvious danger. Therefore, because a jury's answers to special interrogatories must, if at all possible, be read harmoniously, Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist. v. Nelson, 11 Utah 2d 253, 358 P.2d
81 (1960); Van Clove v. Betts, 16 Wash.
Apn. 748, 559 P.2d 1006 (1977), and in light
of the presumption that the jury followed
the instructions, we must reject defendant's
theory. Clearly, under the instructions, the
jury could have found plaintiff's negligence
a proximate cause but chose not to do so.

Mitchell Funeral Home Ambulance
Utah, 606 P.2d 259 (1980).

Serv.,

The next issue arises out of the trial
court's refusal to instruct the jury on assumption of risk. Both plaintiff and defendant submitted proposed instructions on
the issue. The judge's rationale for his
ruling was as follows:
I think it is a negligence case, is what it
is, a comparative negligence case. I
think the instructions ought to be limited
to that, excluding assumption of the risk
which, under comparative negligence, is
part of comparative [contributory] negligence.
Undoubtedly, in so ruling the court had in
mind § 78-27-37 U.C.A. (1953), which provides:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his
legal representative to recover damages
for negligence or gross negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or
property, if such negligence was not as
great as the negligence or gross negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed
shall be diminished in the proportion to
the amount of negligence attributable to
the person recovering. As used in this
act, "contributory negligence" includes
"assumption of the risk."

In sum, although Instruction 22 did not
state that defendant had a duty to warn of
obvious dangers, 3 the error was harmless
because there was no "reasonable likelihood
. . . that . . . there would have been a result more favorable" to defendant had the
instruction been as requested. Rowley v.
Graven Bros. & Co., 26 Utah 2d 448, 451,
491 P.2d 1209, 1211 (1971). See also Lee v.

With time it has become clear that the
assumption of risk defense in fact included
at lenst three different legal concepts. Sen
Jacobsen Construction Co. v.
Structo-L;tn
Engineering,
Inc., Ut-ih, 619 P.2d 306
(1930), and authorities there cited. On^
form of assumption of risk has been referred to by some as primary assumption of
risk, which may be either expressed ^ implied. The "primary express" form involves
an agreement by the plaintiff to accept the

3. Instruction No. 22, which was given by the
court, stated:
If you find by a preponderance of the evidence that, at the time of his injury, Mr.
Moore was defendant's "business invitee," as
chat term is defined hereinafter, then defendant's duty to Mr. Moore was to refrain from
any acts of negligence toward him; to exercise reasonable care to keep the premises,

including the radial arm saw thereon, in a
condition reasonably safe for purposes consistent with his presence there: and to warn
him of any and all dangers involving the
operation of said saw which .vere known to
the defendant or should have become known
to the defendant in the exercise of reasonable
diligence and the performance of reasonable
inspections.
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risk or danger, and the "primary implied"
form involves a relationship in which defendant simply owes no duty of care to the
plaintiff. Secondary assumption of risk is,
as stated, the unreasonable encountering of
a known and appreciated risk and in reality
an aspect of contributory negligence.
Rigtrup v. Strawberry Water User's Ass'n y
Utah, 563 P.2d 1247 (1977); Jacobsen Construction Co. v. Structo-Lite
Engineering,
Inc., supra.
[3] Both assumption of risk and contributory negligence are founded on unreasonable conduct. Each concept focuses on a
different aspect of unreasonableness in the
face of a risk of harm. A plaintiffs failure
to foresee a danger which a reasonable person acting in a prudent manner would have
foreseen is designated negligent conduct.
Assumption of risk designates conduct of a
person who unreasonably takes a known
and appreciated risk.
[4, 5] Assumption of risk, as that term is
used in § 78-27-37, is a voluntary and
unreasonable exposure to a known danger.
Jacobsen Construction Company v. StructoLite Engineering, Inc., supra. The complete bar to recovery in an action for negligence, which assumption of risk has been
historically, has been lifted by the Utah
comparative negligence statute to avoid the
harshness visited upon plaintiffs as a result
of the all-or-nothing nature of the former
rule of law.4 Secondary assumption of risk
is treated in the same manner as contributory negligence for the purpose of apportioning fault under the comparative negligence statute.
Higtrup v.
Strawberry
Water User's Ass'n, Utah, 563 P.2d 1247
(1977). The relationship between the two
concepts was explained in Jacobsen Construction Company v. Structo-Lite
Engineering, Inc., supra at 312:
. . . the reasonableness of p fain tiff's conduct in confronting a known or unknown
risk created by defendant's negligence
will b?sically be determined under principles of contributory negligence. Atten4.

Comparative principles as to a plaintiffs and
defendant's liability in causing personal injury
were recently held to apply in strict liability

tion should be focused on whether a reasonably prudent man in the exercise of
due care would have incurred the risk,
despite his knowledge of it, and if so,
whether he would have conducted himself
in the manner in which the plaintiff acted
in light of all the surrounding circumstances, including the appreciated risk.
See Leavitt v. Gillaspie, Alaska, 443 P.2d
61 (1968). Then, if plaintiff's unreasonableness is viewed to be less than that of
defendant, according to the terms of the
statute, "any damages allowed shall be
diminished in proportion to the amount of
negligence attributable to the person recovering." [Footnote omitted.]
In light of the difficulties arising from
the several meetings of the term assumption of risk, some authorities have advocated the complete abolition of the term "assumption of risk" and the utilization of
other legal terminology to describe the conduct. See 2 Harper and James, Law of
Torts § 21.8 at 1191-92 (1956); Flemming,
Law of Torts, 241-58 (2nd ed. 1961). We
agree.
Defendant maintains that Rigtrup v.
Strawberry Water Users Ass'n, Utah, 563
P.2d 1247 (1977), heM that assumption cf
risk is still a complete bar to recovery.
Insofar as that part of assumption of risk
which is an aspect of contributory negligence is concerned, that case did not so
hold. Rigtrup recognized that "where there
is a known danger, the risk of which is
voluntarily assumed by a party, such action
may well fall within the lack of due care
which constitutes negligence and may also
be correctly termed a/* assumption of risk."
[563 P.2d at 1250.] The Court referred to
the statutory language that "contributory
negligence includes assumption of risk' under tne comparative r.egligence statute and
stated that the statuto "indicates a cfe;-.r
legislative intent to recognize the doctrine
of assumption of risK' as an aspect of contributory negligence in Utah law." [Ibid]
The Court held assumption of risk shoui j be
cases. Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., Utah,
628 P.2d 1301 (1981).
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treated in a comparative manner as an aspect of contributory negligence. Nevertheless, the Court did approve the giving of
instructions on both assumption of risk and
contributory negligence.
[6] Even though decided after the appeal in this case, the principles governing
the relationship of contributory negligence
and assumption of risk enunciated in Jacobsen are controlling here. Since the duty of
the plaintiff and the consequences of a
breach thereof were explained to the jury
in appropriate language, there was no error
in not giving an instruction on secondary
assumption of risk in addition to a contributory negligence instruction. In short, we do
not think that instructions on both contributory negligence and assumption of risk in
this case were necessary. To the extent
that Rigtrup is inconsistent with this opinion, it is hereby overruled. It follows from
what has been stated that it was not error
to refuse to require the jury to make a
specific additional finding in the language
of assumption of risk beyond that required
in the contributory negligence interrogatory. Further support for the conclusion is
found in the fact that defendant's proposed
assumption of risk instructions, which were
not given, were erroneous and could not
have provided a foundation for the interrogatory.5
Finally, there is no contention in this case
that there was an agreement whereby
plaintiff agreed to accept the danger here,
nor was the relationship between plaintiff
and defendant such that defendant had no
duty of care to the plaintiff.
5. Indeed, defendant's proposed Instruction
Nos. 11 and 12 on "assumption of risk" clearly
incorporated classical contributory negligence
language:
INSTRUCTION NO. 11
There is a legal principal [sic] commonly
referred to by the term "assumption of risk"
which is as follows:
One is said to assume a risk when he voluntarily manifests his assent to a dangerous
condition and voluntarily exposes himself to
that danger when he knows, or in the exercise of ordinary care would know, that a
danger exists in the condition of the equipment or premises and uses the equipment
and premises and voluntarily places himself
or remains, within the position of danger.

[7J Defendant's final claim on appeal is
that the jury should have been instructed
that, as a matter of law, plaintiff was negligent and that the negligence was the sole
cause of the injury, or alternatively that it
was a proximate cause of the injury. The
court correctly refused to give the instruction. Clearly there were factual issues both
as to negligence on the part of both parties
and as to the cause of the injury, and we
are obliged to sustain the jury's findings
because there was substantial evidence in
the record to support those findings. Maltby v. Cox Construction Co., Utah, 598 P.2d
336 (1979); Gordon v. Provo City 15 Utah
2d 287, 391 P.2d 430 (1964).
The judgment
plaintiff.

is affirmed.

Costs to

MAUGHAN, C. J., and WILKINS, J.,*
concur.
HALL, Justice (dissenting):
It appears from the evidence that one of
three things, or a combination thereof,
could have caused plaintiff's injuries: 1)
lack of a blade guard, 2) creeping of the
blade, or 3) plaintiff's inattention.
The record contains no direct evidence
that the lack of a blade guard or the creeping of the saw blade actually caused the
accident. Plaintiff's expert witness did testify, however, as to the obvious nature of
those two dangers. He opined that it was
"plain to see" that the saw was "unreasonaINSTRUCTION NO. 12
Before the doctrine of assumption of risk is
applicable, you must find: (1) the person in
question must have actual knowledge of th'i
canger, or the conditions must be such that
he would have such knowledge if he exercised ordinary' care, (2) he must have freedom of choice. This freedom of choice must
have come from circumstances that provide
him a reasonable opportunity, without violating any legal or moral duty to safely refuse to
expose himself to the danger in question.
An intenogatory based on those definitions of
assumption of risk would have been improper.
* Wi'kins, Justice, acted on this case prior to his
resignation.
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b!y dangerous" since it lacked a blade
guard, and since it "had a tendency to
move" forward from the rest position.
These dangers were certainly obvious to
him since he based his opinion, not upon his
operation or testing of the saw, but simply
upon his brief observation of it, from which
he theorized that the blade, turning up to
4,000 rpm, would cause "some movement of
the blade." Anyone with plaintiffs experience and familiarity with saws could, and
should have readily made the same observation before proceeding to use the saw.
Plaintiffs testimony as to causation was:
I took the two-by-four and I slid it in
front of the one-by-four [guide] towards
the nail [gauge] and against the one-byfour . . . .
As I glanced over now to
focus my attention on that nail and to
make sure this edge of the two-by-four
was up against the one-by-four, I felt the
saw grab my thumb and yank my hand
into the blade . . . .
In light of the foregoing explanation of
the event by plaintiff, it matters not whether the "tendency of the blade to move" was
an obvious danger, since it seems that it
could not have been a cause of the accident
anyway. This is to be seen in that had the
blade in fact crept forward, it would necessarily have come to rest when it came in
contact with the- two-by-four plaintiff was
positioning to cut. Certainly, without manual assistance, the blade could not have cut
through the two-by-four which it would
have had to do to reach plaintiffs hand.
This assumes, of course, that plaintiffs
hand was properly positioned on the front
side of the two-by-four, away from the
blade.
Inasmuch as the jury found negligence on
the part of the plaintiff, it apparently concluded that plaintiff did not properly position his hand on the front side of the two-

by-four, away from the blade, but that by
inattention or otherwise, he reached over
the two-by-four to the back side thereof,
and into the blade.
When viewed in light of all of the facts
of this case, I deem the error in failing to
give an "obvious danger" instruction as not
merely harmless. The failure to give an
instruction to which a party is entitled may
constitute reversible error if it tends to: 1)
mislead the jury to the prejudice of the
complaining party; or 2) insufficiently or
erroneously advises the jury as to the law.1
In this case, the absence of an obvious danger instruction may well have prevented a
proper determination as to whether defendant was negligent in the first instance.
Therefore, I view the error as prejudicial.
What has heretofore been said applies
equally to the court's refusal to instruct the
jury on the doctrine of assumption of risk.
Notwithstanding the position taken by the
main opinion, I view the case of Rigtrup v.
Strawberry
Water Users Association2 as
standing for the proposition that the doctrine of assumption of risk remains a viable
defense, it being consistent with the concepts of comparative fault as delineated in
the Comparative Negligence Act. 3 Moreover, Rule 8(c), U.R.C.P., specifically designates both asrumption of risk and contributory negligence as affirmative defenses.
Application of the doctrine of assumption
of risk requires knowledge by plaintiff of i
specific defect or dangerous condition.4 Assumption of the risk and contributory negligence are distinct legal doctrines. The fcmer applies where one voluntarily exposes
himself to known danger, and the latter
applies where one negligently fails to discover the danger. 5 Situations may arise
where the two doctrines may overlap as
noted by Dean Prosser:

1. State v. Ouzcunian, 26 Utah 2d 442, 491 P.zd
1093 (1971); see also, Rowley v. Graven Brothers & Co., 26 Utah 2d 448, 491 P.2d 1209
(1971).

4.

Ferguson v. Jongsma, 10 Utah 2d 179. 350
F.2d 404 (li:?:); Johnson v. Maynard, 9 L'uh
2d 268, 342 F.?d 884 (1959); see also. Foster v.
Steed, 23 Utah 2d 148, 459 P.2d 1021 (1969).

2.

Utah, 563 P.2d 1247 (1977).

5.

X

U.C.A.mr-3, 7^-27-37.

Kuchennwister v. Los Angeles and S.LR. Co..
52 Utah 1 ]*;, 1 ,2 P. 725 (1918); see also. City
v. Dunford, 121 Utah 177, 239 P.2d 1075(1952).
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Obviously the two may co-exist when the
plaintiff makes an unreasonable choice to
incur the risk; but either may exist without the other. The significant difference,
when there is one, is likely to be one
between risks which were in fact known
to the plaintiff, and risks which he merely might have discovered by the exercise
of ordinary care. 6
In the past, the terms have often been
rather loosely applied. This was so because
each was a complete defense to a negligence action, that is, whether one knowingly or negligently "assumed the risk," the
result was the same—no recovery. When
the legislature passed our Comparative
Negligence Act, supra, it specifically recognized the doctrine of "assumption of the
risk" and included it within the term "contributory negligence." Since the enactment
thereof, this Court has held that assumption
of risk remains a viable defense in Utah.
In Rigtrup, supra, this Court approved the
giving of instructions both on contributory
negligence and assumption of risk. The
matter was stated therein as follows:
Though there have been some differences in view as to the defense of assumption of risk and its relation to other
aspects of contributory negligence, it has
since time immemorial been regarded as
a valid defense in the law of this State.
It has sometimes been said to be but a
specialized aspect of contributory negligence in that it can be intermingled and
fused with other aspects thereof in certain circumstances. It is also sometimes
said to be something separate from contributory negligence, as it undoubtedly
can be in some circumstances. However,
it requires but little reflection to see that
where there is a known danger, the risk
of which is voluntarily assumed by a party, such action may well fall within the
lack of due care which constitutes negligence and also may be correctly termed

an assumption of risk. [Citations omitted.] If such be the situation, the party
should be charged with the responsibility
for his conduct, by whatever term it may
be called; and the comparative negligence statute quoted above should be applied . . . .
That our conclusion just stated is the
correct one under our law is supported,
not only by the reasoning just stated and
the cases cited, but is made abundantly
clear by the fact that the legislature,
apparently in order to avoid any misunderstanding thereon, appended the last
sentence as quoted above that: as used in
this act, "contributory negligence ,, includes "assumption of the risk." That
sentence indicates a clear legislative intent to recognize the doctrine of "assumption of risk" as an aspect of contributory negligence in Utah law. Therefore
any attempt on our part to judicially
abolish that defense would amount to a
direct repudiation of the legislative expression and thus a clear usurpation of
the legislative prerogative. 9
9 See Becker v. Beaverton School Dist., 25
Or.App. 879, 551 P.2d 498, where the court
refused to rule that a comparative negligence
statute had completely abolished the defense
of assumption of the risk.

Therefore, the negligence of a plaintiff
who knowingly and voluntarily encounters
a risk is to be compared with any of that of
a defendant pursuant to the provisions of
the Comparative Negligence Act, supra. 7
In the instant case, plaintiff's knowledge
and appreciation of the danger involved in
operating the saw was a question for the
juiy, 8 and it was error for the court not to
give an appropriate instruction on such assumption of risk.
I wjuld reverse and ren.and for the purpose of a new trial.
CROCKETT, J., concurs in the dissenting
opinion of HALL, J.
isii assumption of risk as a defense, but only
suggested the abolition of "assumption of risk"
terminology.

6. Handbook of the Law of Torts, William Prosser (4th ed.). § Go, at p. 441.
7. Jncob.-rn Const. Co. v. Structo-Lite Engineering, Inc., Utah, G13 P.2d 306 (1980). It is to be
noted that the holding in Jacobsen did not abol631 P. 2d—20

8.

Wold v. Ogden City, 123 Utah 270, 258 P.2d
453 (1953).
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JACOBSEN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., a corporation; Jelco, Incorporated, a corporation; and Central Utah
Water Conservancy District, a body corporate and politic, Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
STRUCTO-LITE ENGINEERING, INC.,
a corporation, Defendant and
Appellant.
No. 16208.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Oct. 1, 1980.
Contractors building water treatment
plant filed action against subcontractors
who constructed chemical storage tanks on
theories of negligence and breach of express warranty for faulty construction of
such storage tanks. The Third District
Court, Salt Lake, James S. Sawaya, J., entered judgment on a verdict which had been
directed against subcontractors and reduced
damages based on contributory negligence
and assumption of risk. Appeals were taken. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held
that: (1) under Utah's comparative negligence statute, "assumption of risk" language is not appropriate to describe the
various concepts previously dealt with under that terminology, but is to be treated,
in its secondary sense, as contributory negligence, and reasonableness of plaintiffs conduct in confronting a known or unknown
risk created by defendant's negligence will
basically be determined under principles of
contributory negligence, and (2) in a negligence action wherein assumption of risk is
raised, attention should be focused upon
whether a reasonably prudent man in the
exercise of due care would have incurred
the risk, despite his knowledge of it, and, if
so, whether he would have conducted himself in the manner in which plaintiff acted
in light of all surrounding circumstances,
including the appreciated risk, and then, if
plaintiff's unreasonableness is viewed to be
less than that of defendant, according to
the terms of comparative negligence statute, any damages allowed shall be diminish-

ed in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering.
Judgment affirmed.
Hall, J., concurred in the result
Crockett, C. J., concurred in the result
and filed opinion.
1. Contracts <3=» 350(1)
Negligence e=> 135(1)
In negligence and express warranty action by contractor building water treatment
plant against subcontractors who constructed chemical storage tanks, evidence supported verdict of contributory negligence,
and, furthermore, supported jury's finding
of assumption of risk. U.C.A.1953, 78-2737.
2. Negligence @=>105
For purposes of action brought by contractors building water treatment plant
against subcontractors who constructed
chemical storage tanks, term "assumption
of risk" meant voluntary, yet unreasonable,
encounter with known, appreciated risk.
U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
3. Negligence c=>97
The complete bar to recovery which
"assumption of risk" once constituted in a
negligence action has been abolished by the
comparative negligence statute to avoid the
harshness visited upon plaintiffs as a result
of the all-or-nothing nature of the former
rule of law. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37.
4. Negligence <3=> 105
In its primary sense, assumption of risk
is alternative expression for proposition
that defendant was not negligent, that is,
there was no duty owed or there was no
breach of existing duties; in its secondary
sense, assumption of n k is affirmative defense to established breach of duty and as
such is phase of contributory negligence.
U.C.A 1953, 78-27-37.
5. Negligence c=>97
Under Utah's comparative negligence
statute, "assumption of risk" language is
not appropriate to describe various concepts
previously dealt with under that terminology but is to be treated, in its secondary
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sense, as contributory negligence; specifically, reasonableness of plaintiffs* conduct
in confronting known or unknown risk created by defendant's negligence will basically be determined under principles of contributory negligence. U.C.A.1953, 78-2737.
6. Negligence c=>98
For purposes of assumption-of risk defense under comparative negligence statute,
attention should be focused on whether reasonably prudent man in exercise of due care
would have incurred risk, despite his knowledge of it, and, if so, whether he would
have conducted himself in manner in which
plaintiff acted in light of all surrounding
circumstances, including appreciated risk;
then, if plaintiff's unreasonableness is
viewed to be less than that of defendant,
according to terms of comparative negligence statute, any damages allowed shall be
diminished in proportion to amount of negligence attributable to person recovering.
U.C.A.1953, 78-27 37.
7. Contracts c^3f>4
Negligence c=^142
In action brought by contractors building water treatment plant against subcontractors who constructed chemical storage
tanks on theories of negligence and breach
of express warranty wherein jury apportioned by percentage fault of each party
without differentiating between negligence
and breach of express warranty causes of
ai lion, since same conduct of defendant
constituted both negligence and breach of
warranty and jury was instructed that
damages arising from breach of warranty
were same as for negligence, finding of
assumption of risk applied equally to both
negligence and warranty claims. U.C.A.
1953, 78-27-37.
Raymond M. Berry and H. James Clegg
of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, Harold
A. Hintze, Salt Lake City, for defendant
and appellant.
Arthur H. Nielsen and W. Waldan Lloyd
of Nielsen, Henriod, Gottfredson & Peck,
Edward W. Clyde of Clyde & Pratt, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiffs and respondents.

STEWART, Justice:
This appeal by defendant is from a judgment awarding plaintiffs damages resulting
from defendant's faulty construction of a
fiberglass storage tank. Defendant's claim
is that the jury's finding of assumption of
risk entirely precludes a judgment for
plaintiff under both of plaintiffs' theories
of recovery: negligence and breach of express warranty. The central issues raised
are (1) whether assumption of risk is a
complete bar to plaintiffs' recovery under
Utah's comparative negligence statute,
Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, § 7827-37, and (2) whether assumption of risk
constitutes a defense to an action for
breach of express warranty.
Plaintiffs Jacobsen Construction Company and Jelco, Inc. ("Jacobsen-Jelco"), acting as joint venturers, contracted with
plaintiff Central Utah Water Conservancy
District ("Conservancy District") to build a
water treatment plant. Jacobsen-Jelco entered into a subcontract with defendant
Strrcto-Lite Engineering, Inc. ("StructoLite") whereby Structo-Lite would provide
si:: fiberglass chemical storage tanks construct td in accordance with the plans and
specifications of the project engineers,
tlii»\! party defendant Templeton, Linkj
and Associates.
Mr. Bevan, president of Structo-Lite :
represented to Jacobsen's agent that Structo-Lito would fabricate fiberglass tanks
which would meet the plans and specifications of the project engineers. Mr. l:Jevan
personally signed the purchase order widen
provided that Structo Lite would supply
the tanks in conformitv with all engineering plans and specifications and thai they
would be warranted by Structo-Lite as to
qualify of workmanship and materials.
After defendant delivered the taaks to
the job site, the project superintendent for
Jacol sen- Jelco observed that some of the
temporary supports used to maintain roundness had failed in transit, causing the tanks
to appear elliptical at the open end and
resulting in damage to the flanges located
at the tops of the tanks. Mr. Bevan, upon
beine informed of these findings, indicated
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that he would make the necessary repairs
and install the remaining connections.
Prior to completion of the job, all six
tanks were filled with water to test for
leaks. Four of the six tanks were found to
have minor leaks. The tank which subsequently failed was not one of the four.
Structo-Lite, upon being informed of the
leaks, made the necessary repairs.
Upon completion of the project and prior
to operation, a seven-day test of the facilities was conducted. The plant, upon passing the test, was declared ready for operation.
Liquid alum w;is poured into one of the
tanks in May of 1974. The following July a
tank which subsequently exploded was
filled with alum. The day after the chemical was placed in the tank, the plant operator noticed a minute leak. Before he could
lessen the pressure, the tank exploded,
spreading the liquid chemical throughout
the entire building. Substantial damage to
the heating and electrical system in the
plant resulted.
Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging negligence in the construction of the tanks and
breach of contract and express warranty
for failure to construct the tanks according
to the specifications agreed upon. StructoLite filed a third-party complaint against
Templeton, Linke and Associates for inadequate design and specifications.
After all testimony was submitted, the
trial court directed a verdict against Structo-Lite on the ground that the evidence
showed as a matter of law that the tanks
had been negligently manufactured. Defendant then requested that special interrogatories be submitted to the jury. In
answer to the interrogatories, the jury
found Jacobsen-Jelco and Conservancy District had been contributorily negligent and
had assumed the nsk of the incurred damages. In apportioning the proximate contribution of each party toward the loss, the
jury found Structo-Lite 70% liable and Jacobsen-Jelco and Conservancy District 20%
and 10% responsible, respectively. The jury
found Templeton, Linke and Associates,
third-party defendants, not negligent.

[1] Plaintiffs cross-appeal, contending
that they were entitled to a finding, as a
matter of law, that they were not contributorily negligent and that they had not assumed the risk of defendant's negligence
The evidence show3 that Jacobsen-Jelco
was aware that the tanks were "out-ofround," a visual inspection evidencing a
three to four inch differential in tank diameter from the high to the low spot on the
tank. Jacobsen-Jelco was also aware of an
elliptical shape and damaged flanges located at the top end of the tanks resulting
from failure of the bracing supports during
transit to the water plant. Conservancy
District noticed during construction of the
tanks that they did not all have smooth
surfaces and detected spots where the woven roving was not covered by the fiberglass matting. Further, after installation
at the plant site, flat spots and irregularities on the tanks were noticed.
After the water testing revealed leaks in
several of the tanks, plaintiffs, knowing
that alum solution was heavier than water,
proceeded to fill the tanks with alum solution without any further testing for tcns;le
strength. Moreover, testing by the American Testing Laboratories at the direction of
Jacobsen-Jelco revealed some deficiencies
in the fabrication of the tanks. P'aintiffs'
knowledge of these defects must be viewed
in light of the warranty given by defendants that the tanks would conform to the
specifications of the general contracf, in
eluding a tensile strength of 100,000 ps' and
a flexal strength of 150,000 psi with a "very
smooth, hard surface and good finishirg
properties "
We review the facts and the inferences to
be drawn therefrom in favor of the veruict
and conclude that the verdict as to contributory negligence is supported by the evidence. Furthermore, there is a reasonable
basis in the evidence to find that plaintiffs
unreasonably proceeded in light of their
knowledge and appreciation of fhe risk created by defendant, and we thus uphold the
jury's finding of plaintiffs' assumption of
risk.
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[2,3] We next address the contention
raised by defendant that plaintiffs' assumption of risk should completely bar recovery.
The term "assumption of risk" has been
historically defined and applied in different
ways. Under the circumstances in this
case, the term "assumption of risk" meant
the voluntary, yet unreasonable, encounter
of a known, appreciated risk. The complete
bar to recovery which such conduct once
constituted in a negligence action has been
abolished by the Utah comparative negligence statute to avoid the harshness visited
upon plaintiffs as a result of the all-ornothing nature of the former rule of law.
Section 78-27-37 provides:
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his
legal representative to recover damages
for negligence or gross negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or
property, if such negligence was not as
great as the negligence or gross negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any damages allowed
shall be diminished in the proportion to
the amount of negligence attributable to
the person recovering. As used in this
'act, "contributory negligence" includes
"assumption of the risk."
The legislative intent to include assumption of risk within contributory negligence
terminology and eliminate the use of the
term is consistent with a recent trend established by other courts, legislatures, and
legal commentators alike.
The 1973 Oregon Legislature passed the
Oregon Comparative Negligence Statute
which is basically identical to Utah's comparative negligence statute. Two years later, in an apparent attempt to clarify its
intent, the Legislature amended the Act.
ORS 18.470 Oregon Laws, 1975, Chapter
599, § 4(2) now reads: "The doctrine of
implied assumption of the risk is abolished."
Connecticut has likewise abolished the term
1. Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion
in i'UL-r v. Atlantic Const Line R. Co., 318 U.S.
54, 68, 63 S.Ct. 414, 451, 87 L.i£d. 610 (1943),
commented upon this contusion:
i he phrase "assumption of risk" is an exfeJIr-iu :.'u;- ration oi t!:v extent to which un-

by statute. G.S.C.A. § 52-572h (1973). See
also North Dakota Statute N.D.C.C. § 9 10-46 (1973); Wentz v. Deseth, N.D., 221
N.W.2d 101 (1974).
The term "assumption of risk" has caused
considerable confusion in its indiscriminate
use.1 Its overuse in the number and variety
of definitions of the term have brought
disfavor to the defense, and the trend has
been to eliminate its use in favor of negligence language. See Keeton, Assumption
of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 La.L.
Rev. 122, 123-30 (1961); Prosser, Law of
Torts § 68 (4th ed. 1971); 2 Harper and
James, The Law of Torts § 21.1 (1956).
Feigner v. Anderson, 375 Mich. 23, 133
N.W.2d 136, 148-49 n.4 (1965), quoted Professor James:
"The doctrine of assumption of risk,
however it is analyzed and defined, is in
most of its aspects a defendant's doctrine
which restricts liability and so cuts down
the compensation of accident victims. It
is a heritage of the extreme individualism
of the early industrial revolution. But
quite aside from any questions of policy
or of substance, the concept of assuming
the risk is purely duplicative of other
more widely understood concepts, such as
scope of duty or contributory negligence.
The one exception is to be found, perhaps,
in those cases where there is an actual
agreement. Moreover, the expression has
come to stand for two or three distinct
notions which are not at all the same,
though they often overlap in the sense
that they are applicable to the same situation.
"Except for express assumption of risk,
therefore, the torm and the concept
should be abolisned. It adds nothing to
modern law except confusion. For the
most part the policy of individualism it
represents is outmoded in accident laws;
w lie re it is not, that policy can find lull
critical use of words bedevils the law. A
phrase begins life a.s a literary expression; its
felicity leads to i's l,\zy repetition; an J repetition soon estabi.sites it as a legal formula,
uiidiscriminatingiy used to express dif f erent
and sometimes coi Padictorv ideas.
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scope and far better expression in other
language. There is only one thing that
can be said for assumption of risk. In
the confusion it introduces, it sometimesironically and quite capriciously-leads to
a relaxation of an overstrict rule in some
other field. The aura of disfavor that
has come to surround it may occasionally
turn out to be the kiss of death to some
other bad rule with which it has become
associated. We have seen how this may
happen with the burden of pleading and
proving an exceptional limitation on the
scope of defendant's duty. There may be
other instances. But at best this sort of
thing is a poor excuse indeed for continuing the confusion of an unfortunate form
of words."
[James, Assumption of Risk, 61 Yale L.J.
141, 168-69 (1952).]
For purposes of analysis, assumption of
risk is often divided into three categories.
Those courts which attempt to deal with the
various concepts subsumed under the one
label refrain from considering one form,
that is, the "express" form of assumption of
risk. See Blackburn v. Dorta, Fla., 343
So.2d 287, 239 (1977); Meistrich v. Casino
Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d
9U (1959). An express assumption of risk
involves a contractual provision in which a
party expressly contracts not to sue for
injury or loss which may thereafter be occasioned by the acts of another. We not only
follow suit by refraining to include this
form of assumption of risk in our discussion, but furthermore fail to see a necessity
for including this form within assumption
of risk terminology. As stated in James,
Assumption of Risk, 61 Yale L.J. 141 (1952),
the field of contract law is more than adequate to deal with this bar to recover}'.
[4] We are thus left with the primary
and secondary forms of assumption of risk.
In its primary sense, it is an alternative
expression for the proposition that defendant was not negligent, that is, there was no
duty owed or there was no breach of an
existing duty, in its secondary sense, assumption of risk is an affirmative defense
to an established breach of duty and as such

is a phase of contributory negligence. As
stated in Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., supra :
We here speak solely of the area in
which injury or damage was neither intended nor expressly contracted to be
nonactionable. In this area, assumption
of risk has two distinct meanings. In one
sense (sometimes called its "primary"
sense), it is an alternate expression for
the proposition that defendant was not
negligent, /. e., either owed no duty or did
not breach the duty owed. In its other
sense (sometimes called "secondary"), assumption of risk is an affirmative defense
to an established breach of duty. In its
primary sense, it is accurate to say plaintiff assumed the risk whether or not he
was "at fault", for the truth thereby expressed in alternate terminology is that
defendant was not negligent. But in its
secondary sense, /. e., as an affirmative
defense to an established breach of defendant's duty, it is incorrect to say plaintiff assumed the risk whether or not he
was at fault.
*
*
*
*
*
*
Hence we think it clear that assumption of risk in its secondary sense is a
mere phase of contributory negligence,
the total issue being whether a reasonably prudent man in the exercise of due
care (a) would have incurred the known
risk and (b) if he would, whether si'cn a
person in the light of all of : h'.1 circumstances including the appreciated risk
would have conducted hims»-if in the
manner in which plaintiff acted.
Thus in the area under discussion there
ar^ but two basic issues: (1) defendant's
negligence, and (2) plaintiff's contributory negligence. In view of the considerations discussed above, it tws been urged
that assumption of risk in both its primary and secondary senses serves merely
to confuse and should be eliminated. Editorial, Assumption of the Risk A False
Issue, 73 N.J.L.J. 346 (1950); James. Assumption of nisk, 61 Yale L.J. 141, 169
(1952); 2 Harper and James, Law of
Torts (1956), § 221.8, p. 1191.
* * * * " « . *
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Perhaps a well-guarded charge of assumption of risk in its primary sense will
aid comprehension. But we cannot see
how a charge of the concept in its secondary sense will contribute a net gain. [155
A.2d at 93, 94-95.]
The New Jersey court disposed of the last
vestiges of assumption ol risk four years
later in McGrath v. American
Cyanamid
Co., 41 N.J. 272, 196 A.2d 238, 239-41
(1963):
In Meistrich v. Casino Arena
Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 155 A.2d 90, 82
A.L.R.2d 1208 (1959), we pointed out that
assumption of the risk was theretofore
used in two incongruous senses: in one
sense it meant the defendant was not
negligent, while in its other sense it
meant the plaintiff was c o n t r i b u t o r y
negligent. We said that in truth there
are but two issues-negligence and contributory negligence- both to be resolved
by the standard of the reasonably prudent man, and that it was erroneous to
suggest to the jury that assumption of
the risk was still another issue.
It was our hop:; that after Meistrich
the bench and bar would focus upon the
true issues, but unhappily some cling to
the terminology of assumption of risk and
continue to be misled by it even while
purporting to think of it as merely a
covertible equivalent of negligence or
contributory negligence.
*
*
*
*
*
*
In Meistrich we said tho terminology of
assumption of the risk should not be used
when it is projected in its secondary
sense, i. e., that of contributory negligence (31 N . J , at p. 55, 155 A.2d at p. 96,
82 A.L.R.2d 1208). We thought, however,
that '[pjerhaps a well-guarded charge of
assumption of risk in its primary sense
will aid comprehension' (31 N.J. p. 54, 155
A.2d p. 9C, 82 A.L.R.2d 1208). * * * Experience, however, indicates the term 'assumption of risk' is so apt to create mist
that it is better banished from the scene.
We hope we have heard the last of it.
Henceforth let us stay with "negligence"
and "contributory negligence."

The New Jersey decisions quoted above
have been cited approvingly by several jurisdictions adopting the same approach.
Leavitt v. Gillaspie, Alaska, 443 P.2d 61
(1968); Fawcett v. Irby, 92 Idaho 48, 436
P.2d 714 (1968) (Spear, J , concurring specially); Feigner v. Anderson, 375 Mich. 23,
133 N.W.2d 136 (1965); Williamson v.
Smith, 83 N.M. 336, 491 P.2d 1147 (1972).
Other courts have likewise abolished the use
of assumption of risk terminology, accepting the argument that assumption of risk
serves no purpose which is not served either
by the doctrine of contributory negligence
or the common law concept of duty. Bolduc v. Crain, 104 N.H. 163, 181 A.2d 641
(1962); McConviUe v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co., 15 Wis.2d 374, 113
N.W.2d 14 (1962). See also Petrone v. Margolis, 20 N.J.Super. 180, 89 A.2d 476 (1952).
The policy set forth in our comparative
negligence act parallels this trend. This
Court was faced with construing the assumption of risk doctrine in light of our
comparative negligence act in Rigtrup v.
Strawberry Water Users Association, Utah,
56:j P.:«\ 1247 (1977). The Court recognized
th( various forms of conduct subsumed under assumption of risk terminology but indicated that retention of the term comported
with the statute and that the term, properly
construed, was not inconsistent with the
comparative fault concept.
Whi.t is important is the concept embodied in the comparative neglige-nce statute,
and the particular labels assigned to the
type of fault involved should not interfere
therewith. The Court in Rigtrup alluded to
this form of analysis by focusing on the
underlying conduct rather than the traditional lerminology in the following statement:
[Assumption of risk) has sometimes been
said to be but a specialized aspect of
contributory negligence in that it can be
intermingled and fused with other aspects thereof in certain circumstances. It
is also sometimes said to be something
separate from contributory negligence, as
ii undoubtedly can be in some circumstances. However, it requires but little
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reflection to see that where there is a
known danger, the risk of which is voluntarily assumed by a party, such action
may well fall within the lack of due care
which constitutes negligence and also
may be correctly termed an assumption
of risk. If such be the situation, the
pnrty should be clvirgvd with the responsibility for his conduct, by whatever term
it may be called; and the comparative
negligence statute quoted above should
be applied as the trial court correctly did
in this case. [Footnotes omitted; emphasis added.) [563 P.2d at 1250.]

In Vernon v. Lake Motors, 26 Utah 2d 269,
488 P.2d 302 (1971), this Court held that a
plaintiff who deliberately and unreasonably
uses a product which he knows to be defective is precluded from recovering damages
in an action for breach of express warranty.3
Nevertheless, it has been argued that the
principles of comparative fault should be
extended to breach of warranty cases. Pursuant to that theory damages would be reduced to the extent of plaintiffs contribution to the fault. But no such proposal is
before the Court, and we refrain from reappraising the status of the law as to assumption of risk as a defense to breach of express warranty.

[5, 6] We thus hold that under our comparative negligence statute "assumption of
risk" language is not appropriate to describe the various concepts previously dealt
In this case the jury apportioned by perwith under that terminology but is to be centage the fault of each party without
treated, in its secondary sense, as contribu- differentiating between the negligence and
tory negligence. Specifically, and with parbreach of express warranty causes of acticular reference to our comparative neglition. Since the same conduct of defendant
gence act, the reasonableness of plaintiff's
constituted both negligence and breach of
conduct in confronting a known or unwarranty, and since the jury was instructed
known risk created by defendant's neglithat tho damages resulting from the breach
gence will basically be determined under
of warranty were the same as for negliprinciples of contributory negligence.2 Atgence, the finding of assumption of risk
tention should be focused on whether a
applies equally to both the negligence and
reasonably prudent man in the exercise of
due carJ would have incurred the risk, de- warranty claims.
As to the remaining issues, we hold that
spite his knowledge of it, and if so, whether
h" would have conducted himself in the the trial court acted within the confines of
manner in which the plaintiff acted in light sound discretion on all counts.
ol all the surrounding circumstances, inThe judgment of the district court is afcluding the appreciated risk. See Leavitt v. firmed. Costs to Respondents.
Gillaspie, supra. Then, if plaintiffs unreasonableness is viewed to be less than that of
MAUGHAN and WILKINS, JJ., concur.
defendant, according to the terms of the
statute, "any damages allowed shall be diHALL, J., concurs in result.
minished in proportion to the amount of
negligence attributable to the person recovCROCKETT, Chief Justice (concurring in
ering."
result).
[7] Defendants next contend that PSsumption of risk should stand as a bar to
recovery for breach of express warranty.
2.

When there is a knowing and express oral or
written consent to the dangerous activity or
condition, a contractual theory will suffice to
l>ar recovery.

3.

We also note that this Court in Ernest W.
Ilnhn, inc. v. Annco .V'\W Co., Utah, GUI P.2d
!">'.': i!97!f\ s t a t e d in <!<• turn t h a t o n e w h o un-

I must confess my inability to see either
necessity or desirability in the main opinion's treatment of what impresses me as an
reasonably proceeds to make use of a product
which he knows to be dangerous cannot recover under a strict products liability theory or
breach of implied warranty theory. The Court
did not address the issue of whether comparative fault had any applicability in such a case.
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effort to discredit the doctrine of assumption of risk in order to decide this case. It
is my view that the trial court gave a
correct and appropriate instruction as applied to the evidence. That is sufficient to
dispose of the issue.

Though there have been some differences in view as to the defense of assumption of risk and its relation to other
aspects of contributory negligence, it has
since time immemorial been regarded as
a valid defense in the law of this State.

Though it may be true that assumption of
risk is but a specialized aspect of contributory negligence, it has its uses in more
closely focusing attention upon certain fact
situations. 1 The broad principle which underlies contributory negligence is that the
plaintiff fails to use reasonable care for his
own safety. A particular aspect thereof is
where he knows of a danger, and has a
reasonable opportunity to make an alternative choice, but nevertheless voluntarily
proceeds and assumes the risk of harm. 2
This Court has but recently dealt with
this problem in Rigtrup v.
Strawberry
Water Users Ass'n? wherein we stated:
Plaintiffs urge that inasmuch as the
trial court had adequately instructed on
contributory negligence, it was error to
also instruct on assumption of risk. They
argue that this defense is spurious and
should be abolished, citing cases from
states where they assert that has been
done by judicial declaration.* We do not
so read those cases. They deal for the
most part with whether there are meaningful distinctions between contributory
negligence and assumption of risk. Howsoever that might be, we decline the invitation to so change our law. One of the
important values in our system which
tends to produce confidence in and respect for the law is that the Jaw as it is
declared and known has sufficient solidarity and continuity that it can be relic!
on with assurance. We think that those
objectives are best served by the judicial
branch refraining from legislating any
abrupt or dramatic changes of a substantial nature in the law and by leaving any
such changes therein to the legislature,
whose constitutional prerogative it is.*

That our conclusion just stated is the
correct one under our law is supported,
not only by the reasoning just stated and
the cases cited, but is made abundantly
clear by the fact that the legislature,
apparently in order to avoid any misunderstanding thereon, appended the last
sentence as quoted above that: as used in
this act, "contributory negligence1' includes "assumption of the risk." That
sentence indicates a clear legislative intent to recognize the doctrine of "assumption of risk" as an aspect of contributory negligence in Utah law. Therefore
any attempt on our part to judicially
abolish thai defense would amount to a
direct repudiation of the legislative expression and thus a clear usurpation of
ihe l e g i s l a t e prerogative. * * * See citations in original. [Emphasis added.]
In accordance with what has been :;aid
above, I do n<-t join in the main opinion's
treatment of what I regard as the timehonored and, in some instances, useful doctrine of assumption of risk; first, because I
do not think \hat treatment is necessary to
the correct and satisfactory disposition of
this case; c+nd second, because I think the
previous decisions of this Court are sound
and useful applications of the law to the
particular fact situations and that others
will likely continue to occur in the future.

1. See discussion by Justice Henriod, speaking
for the Court, in Cluy v. Duntbrd, et a/., 121
Utah 177, 239 P.2d 1075 (1952).

311; Johnson v. Maynard. 9 Utah 2d 268. 342
P.2d 884 U9.\;").
3.

2.

See Jacques v. Farrimnnd, 14 Utah 2d 1GG,
380 i'.2,: i33 (1SGJ). citing PLOSS-.T on Torts, p.

Utah, 563 P 2c! 1247 (1977).
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formed by the prmcipa1 emplover's own
employees in the prosecution of its business, or as an essential part in the maintenance thereof, it is a part or process of
his work/'
Id. at 1131 (quoting King v Palmer, 129
Conn. 636, o41, 30 A.2d 549, 552 (1943)).
Moreover, if the work performed is a part
or process of the employer's business, an
inference arises that the employer has retained supervision and control over the
work. Bennett, 726 P.2d at 432.
In construing the wage payment statute
to include both contractor-subcontractor's
employee relationships and statutory employer-employee relationships, we give a
broader construction to the wage payment
statute than it had prior to the 1941 amendment, as the Legislature clearly intended,
and at the same time, we avoid an unreasonably broad construction. This interpretation is also consistent with the express
language of wage payment statutes of other states. See Del.Code Ann. tit. 19,
§ 1105 (1985); N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 275:46
(1977); Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 40, § 165.6
(West 1986); W.Va.Code § 21-5-7 (1985).
See also Kan.Stat.Ann. § 44-317 (1986);
'Nev.Rev.Stat. § 608.150 (1986).
The Industrial Commission concedes that
this interpretation is reasonable, but it contends that a question of fact exists as to
whether the construction of condominium
units is part or process of the trade or
business of RDG. We agree. RDG is not
a licensed contractor, but the question
whether constructing condominium units
could be construed to be a part or process
of RDG's trade or business is a question of
fact that must be resolved by the trial
court. Accordingly, further proceedings
are necessary.
Reversed and remanded.
HALL, C.J., and DURHAM and
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
HOWE, J., concurs in the result.
(o
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Joan F. STEPHENS, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Brent HENDERSON, dba Classic
Skating Center, and John Doe,
Defendants and Appellants.
No. 860440.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 13, 1987.

Patron of roller rink brought negligence action against owner. Patron was
awarded damages following judgment on a
jury verdict in the Fourth District Court,
Utah County, Cullen Y. Christensen, J., and
owner appealed. The Supreme Court,
Howe, J., held that: (1) newly enacted Liability Reform Act redefining relationship
between injured party and joint tort-feasors, could not be retroactively applied; (2)
assumption-of-risk language is not appropriate in instruction under comparative
negligence statutes, but was to be treated
as contributory negligence; and (3) instruction on owner's duty to protect patron from
tripping was not different from duty to
protect patron from other negligent or
reckless injury, and was properly refused
as surplusage.
Affirmed.

1. Statutes <3=>266
Theaters and Shows <s=>3.80
Statute eliminating joint and several
liability could not be applied to a negligence action brought by roller rink patron
for injuries occurring prior to statute's effective date, in that statute changed substantive law in effect when cause of action
arose, creating retroactive effect if applied,
and legislature did not expressly direct retroactive effect. U.C.A.1953, 68-3-3, 7827-37 to 78-27-43; U.C.A.1953, 78-27-37
to 78-27-43 (Repelled).
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2. Statutes c^266
Party may not be deprived of statutorily created right simply because judgment
has not been entered, by determining that
change in substantive law is not retroactive
if new statute takes effect before entry of
final judgment. U.C.A.1953, 68-3-3.
3. Negligence 0^141(12)
Assumption-of-risk language is not appropriate in jury instruction under comparative negligence statute, but assumption
of the risk in the secondary sense is to be
treated as contributory negligence.
4. Theaters and Shows <2>6(7, 39)
Duty of roller rink owner to protect
patron from those who intentionally trip
her was not different than duty to protect
patron from those who negligently or recklessly run into her, and jury instruction
regarding intentionally tripping was properly refused as surplusage.
Carman E. Kipp, Salt Lake City, for defendants and appellants.
Ray Harding Ivie. Ray Phillips Ivie and
James G. Cbrk, Provo, for plaintiff and
respondent.
HOWE, JusticeThis is an appeal f»*om a judgment on a
jury verdict in a negligence action. Defondant Brent Henderson dba Classic Skating Center asserts that the trial judge committed reversible error in refusing to give
certain jury instructions requested by him
and in refusing to apply the provisions of
the Liability Reform Act. Utah Code Ann.
§§ 78-27-37 to -43 as amended in 1986.
On November 8, 1984, plaintiff Joan Stephens injured her wrist when she fell after
being tripped by an unknown skater while
she was roller skating at Classic Skating
Center in Orem, Utah. Stephens filed suit,
naming Henderson and "John Doe" as defendants. Trial was held on July 29; 1986.
At the close of plaintiffs case, Henderson's
counsel moved to apply the Liability Reform Act, which became effective April 28,
1986. Application of the Act would have
held each defendant liable for damages

only in proportion to his own individual
fault. The trial court denied the motion.
The court also refused to give certain instructions requested by Henderson. The
jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in the
amount of $17,357.92, finding John Doe 75
percent negligent, Henderson/Classic Skating Center 25 percent negligent, and plaintiff free from any negligence. On August
15, 1986, plaintiff executed against
Henderson for the entire amount of the
judgment.
In 1986, the legislature repealed the
Comparative Negligence Act, Utah Code
Ann. §§ 78-27-37 to -43, and replaced it
with the Liability Reform Act. Utah Code
Ann. §§ 78-27-37 t* -43, as reenacted.
The Liability Reform Act did not expressly
direct that any of its provisions should operate retroactively. Section 78-27-40 of
that Act provides in part: "[T]he maximum
amount for which a defendant may be liable to any person seeking recovery is that
percentage or proportion of the damages
equivalent to the percentage or proportion
of fault attributed to that defendant." In
contrast, the Comparative Negligence Act
provided for joint and several liability, that
is, each defendant vas liable to the plaintiff for the full amount of the plaintiffs
damages.
Henderson conterds that the Liability
Reform Act, eliminating joint and several
liability, should have been applied in Hiis
case. On the other hand, Stephens asserts
that doing so would have effected an impermissible retroactive result.
[1] The starting point for our analysis
is Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3, which provides: "No part of these revised statutes is
retroactive, unless expressly so declared."
The application of a statute is retroactive if
it alters the substantive law on which the
parties relied. See Docutel Olivetti Corp.
v. Dick Brady Systems, Inc., 731 P.2d 475
(Utah 1986); see also Petty v. Clark, 113
Utah 205, 192 P.2d 589 (1948); cf. Archer v.
Utah State Land Board, 15 Utah 2d 321,
392 P.2d 622 (1964). Law is substantive if
it "creates, defines and regulates the rights
and duties of the parties and . . . may give
rise to a cause for action, as distinguished
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from adjective law which pertains to and
prescribes the practice and procedure or
the legal machinery by which the substantive law is determined or made effective."
Petty v. Clark, 192 P 2d at 593-94. Other
jurisdictions have held similar statutes to
be substantive. Russell v. Superior
Court, 185 Cal.App.3d 810, 230 Cal.Rptr.
102 (Cal.App. 1st Dist 1986) (holding Proposition 51, which eliminated joint and several
liability for noneconomic damages, to have
prospective effect only); see also United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Park
City Corp., 397 F.Supp. 411, 414-15 (D.Or.
1973) ("[T]he relationship between the parties is fixed as of the date of the accident.
It is at that time that these parties became
joint tortfeasors. Their rights and obligations as among themselves are governed
by the then existing substantive law
"),
affd, 526 F?d 1120 (9th Cir.1975).
In the instant case, the Comparative
Negligence Act was the substantive law
defining, m part, the relationship between
the parties a. the time of the accident.
Section 78-27-41 provided "Nothing in this
act shall affect: (1) the common-law liability of the several joint tort-feasors to have
,udgment recovered, ard payment made,
fiom them IPOP ,duaibr by the injured person for the whole injury." The Liability
Reform Act rcdefne^ the relationship between the plaintiff and the joint tort-feac t
or 3. Since the Act changes the substanti\ e law in effect when plaintiffs cause of
action arose, its application would have retroactive effect. That being the case, section 68-3-3 dictates that it may not be
applied unless expressly so directed by the
legislature. The Liability Reform Act contains no such express direction.

ing the repeal of a statute holding corporate directors individually liable to stockholders, cases which hold that a statutorily
created right can be destroyed at any time
until final judgment because the right has
not yet vested, are in error Id at 1045
To allow the substantive law m a case to be
changed at any time up until entry of final
judgment would allow a plaintiff to be effectively deprived of a cause of action
Campbell v. Stagg, 596 P2d 1037 (Utah
1979), cited by Henderson as authority, is
inapposite. In that case, we were presented with the question whether it was permissible to include interest on a judgment
for a plaintiffs damages from the time of
the injury, even though the statute allowing such interest became effective after the
accident giving rise to the injuries. In
holding that result permissible, we noted
that the legislature "explicitly directed all
[future] judgments to add interest computed from the time of the act giving rise to
the accident." Id. at 1042. There is no
analogous statutory language in the Lnbil
ity Reform Act.

Our determination that application of the
Liability Reform Act would be impermissibly retroactive ir this case is reinforced by
out decision in Brunyrr v. Salt Lah
County, 551 P.2d 5*1 (Utah 1976) In that
case, we were confronted with whether t
Comparative Negligence Act should apply
to allow contribution between tort-feasors
who had negligently injured the plaintiff
before the effective date of the act. We
held that since the right to contribution
arose by statute after the accident, the
statu-e creating the right could not apply
Our holding in that case was reiterated in
Umgc d Insurance Co v. City of La\ er
kin, 689 P.2d 1344 (dtah 1984), where ue
[2] We note Henderson's argument for stated that Brunyer stands for the proposic n alternate method to determine if a legis- tion that "the oct was not applicable m any
lative act is retroactive. He asserts that resoect to any liability for injuries occurthere is no retroactive effect if a new stat- ring prior to the effect [sic] date of the
ute takes effect before judgment is entered statute/' Id. at 1347 n. 3. A statute elimiin the case. However, we have long held nating joint and several liability may not be
that a party may not be deprived of a right applied to injuries occurring prior to its
simply because judgment has not yet been effective date. The injuries in this case
entered. To paraphrase our holding in occurred on November 8, 1984; the LiabiliButtrey v. Guaranteed Securities Co., 78 ty Reform Act was not effective until April
U*-ih 39, 300 P. 1040 (1931\ a case involv- 28, 1986. Therefore, the trial court was
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correct in holding that the Liability Reform
Act did not apply.
[3] Henderson next contends that the
trial court erred in failing to give his requested jury instruction No. 21:
There is a legal principle, commonly
referred to by the term "assumption of
risk", which is as follows:
One is said to assume a risk when he
voluntarily manifests his assent to a dangerous condition or to the creation or
maintenance of a dangerous condition
and voluntarily exposes himself to that
danger, or when he knows, or in the
exercise of ordinary care would know,
that a danger exists in the condition of
the property and voluntarily places himself or remains within the position of
danger.
If you find that Joan Stephens assumed the risks which were known by
her or which should have been known by
her concerning the dangers associated
with roller skating, she would be guilty
of negligence.
We held in Jacobsen Construction Co. v.
Structo-Lite Engineering, 619 P.2d 306
(Utah 1980), that assumption-of-risk language is not appropriate under our comparative negligence statutes. As was illustrated by that case, assumption of the risk
in its secondary sense, as used in the requested instruction, is to be treated as contributory negligence. Id. at 312. The jury
was given instructions on contributory negligence; therefore, the trial court was correct in refusing defendant's requested instruction No. 21.
[4] Henderson lastly contends that the
trial court erred in refusing to give his
requested instruction No. 27, which read:
Should you determine that the plaintiff
was deliberately knocked down, you are
instructed that a roller skating proprietor
has a duty to guard roller skaters
against assaults by fellow roller skaters
if the circumstances are such that an
ordinarily prudent person might reasonably anticipate the danger of such assaults and knew or should have known of
the tendency of a fellow skater to assault
other pr.trons of the establishment.

Henderson points out that plaintiff's friend
who accompanied her to the roller rink
testified that the unknown skater, after
knocking plaintiff down, yelled, "I scored
another." She further testified that she
had seen him knock down another skater
moments before he made contact with
plaintiff. Henderson argues that this testimony indicates that plaintiff was intentionally assaulted and that consequently requested instruction No. 27 was necessary
to instruct the jury as to the duty
Henderson owed plaintiff to protect her
against intentional torts by other patrons.
We find no prejudicial error in the refusal to give this instruction. It is true, as
asserted by Henderson, that a proprietor,
to be held liable, must have some cause to
believe that one patron may assault another patron. Gustaveson v. Gregg, 655 P.2d
693 (Utah 1982). Nevertheless, under the
facts here such an instruction was not required since the instructions given covered
this subject. Henderson had two floor
guards assigned to monitor the skating and
to warn or remove those skaters who indulged in unsafe practices, such as racing,
pushing, or rowdy behavior. The instructions given by the court informed the jury
that it was the theory of plaintiffs case
that Henderson was negligent because his
floor guards failed to properly supervise
the skating of other patrons of the rink.
The jury was further instructed that the
proprietor of a public amusement has the
duty to use ordinary care and diligence to
protect patrons, but this duty does not extend to becoming an insurer of their safety.
Negligence was defined. Under the facts
of this case, Henderson's duty to protect
plaintiff irom those who wouM intentionally trip her was not different than the duty
to protect her from those who would negligently or recklessly run into her. The
floor guards were there to monitor all skaters. Requested instruction No. 27 was
properly refused as suiplusage since other
instructions adequately covered the duty
owed to plaintiff to protect her from the
errant conduct of other skaters, irrespective of how that conduct might je characterized. This case is unlike Gustaveson v.
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Gregg, supra, where the desk clerk in a
bowling alley who had no responsibility to
monitor the conduct of patrons had no reason to believe that an argument might
erupt between two patrons and that one
might punch the other in the face. In that
case, we held the proprietor not liable as a
matter of law. In the instant case, the
peril was foreseeable, even anticipated, and
floor guards were assigned to watch for
and immediately stop the very conduct
which injured plaintiff.
Affirmed.
HALL, C.J, DURHAM and
ZIMMERMAN, JJ.f and GREGORY K.
ORME, Court of Appeals Judge,
concur.
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice,
does not participate herein; ORME,
Court of Appeals Judge, sat.

Dennis CLARK & Darla Clark dba Discount Bail Bonding, Ed Tolman & Valene Tolman dba Ed Tolman Bail Bonding Company, and H.C. Heninger &
Doris Heninger dba H.C. Heninger Bail
Bonding Company, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
SECOND CIRCUIT COU?.T, STATE OF
UTAH, CACHE COUNTY, Second Circuit Court, State of Utah, Rich County,
Ted S. Perry, Circuit Judge, and David
W. Sorenson, Circuit Judge, Defendants
and Respondents.

on those bonds. Affected bail bondsman
and other bail bondsmen filed petition for
extraordinary writ challenging bail forfeitures. The day after petition was filed,
another Circuit Court judge delivered letter
to sheriff prohibiting all petitioners from
posting bail in that circuit, while petition
was pending in court. Bail bondsmen re*
ceived no notice of this action. The First
District Court, Cache County, John F.
Wahlquist, J., dismissed the petition. Bail
bondsmen other than the one whose bonds
were forfeited appealed. The Supreme
Court, Stewart, Associate C.J., held that:
(1) appellants had no standing to appeal
forfeiture of first bail bondsman's bonds,
and (2) extraordinary writ should have been
granted.
Pveversed in part, and remanded; dismissed in part.
1. Appeal and Error <3=>877(3)
Bail bondsmen appealing revocation of
bail bonding authority did not have standing to appeal the forfe'ture of bonds of
another bail bondsman, v.'ho was party to
lower court suit, but did not join on appeal.
2. Courts <$=>209(2)
Bail bondsmen had standing to challenge propriety of judge's letter prohibiting
them, without prior notice from posting
bonds in circuit court during pendency of
district court action, although petition for
extraordinary writ in lower court did not
attack the letter or seel: release from its
effect, where the issues concerning letter
were in fact raised, tried by consent, and
adjudicated in lower court's findings and
conclusions.

Aug. 18, 1987.

3. Courts <3=>207.1
Prohibition $»3(1)
Relief by extraordinary writ was appropriate where circuit n ourt judge wrote
letter to sheriff terminating bail bondsmen's ability to post bonds, without notice
or hearing.

Circuit judge, on own initiative, forfeited bail posted for three defendants and
entered judgment against bail bondsman

A.W. Lauritzen, Logan, for plaintiffs and
appellants.

No. 21062.
Supreme Court of Utah.
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Ernestina MARTIN, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
SAFEWAY STORES INCORPORATED,
Defendant and Respondent.
No. 14492.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 20, 1977.
Action was brought to recover damages
for broken leg resulting from fall on sidewalk leading from parking lot of grocery
store to main entrance of store. The Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, G. Hal
Taylor, J., granted defendant's motion for
directed verdict and plaintiff appealed.
The Supreme Court, Swan, J., held that
where store employees had shoveled snow
and cleaned and salted sidewalk at 2:00 p.
m. and again at 5:00 p. m., and icy spot on
which plaintiff fell at approximately 9:30 p.
m., after the store had closed, was only 12
inches by 14 inches in area, store employees
hard met their duty in making the sidewalk
reasonably safe.
Affirmed.
Wilkins, J., concurred in result.
Maughan, J., dissented.
1. Negligence <®=>32(1)
Property owners are not insurers of the
safety of those who come upon their property, even though they are business invitees.
2. Negligence s=>48
Liability of owner of store for injury to
customers should be established only when
the condition complained of has existed for
a long enough time that the owner should
have known about it and corrected it, or has
had actual knowledge of the condition complained of.
3. Municipal Corporations <$=* 808(5)
It is not the duty of persons in control
of stores, banks, office buildings, theaters
or other buildings where the public is invit-

ed to come on business or for pleasure to
mop the sidewalk dry or take other steps
necessary to prevent the accumulation of
moisture on the sidewalk that might freeze
and create an icv condition.
4. Negligence <3=>50
Where store employees had shoveled
snow and cleaned and salted sidewalk leading from parking lot to store at 2:00 p. m.
and again at 5:00 p. m., and icy spot on
which plaintiff fell at approximately 9:30 p.
m., after the store had closed, was only 12
inches by 14 inches in area, store employees
had met their duty in making the sidewalk
reasonably safe.
5. Appeal and Error <£=> 970(2)
Evidence <8=>143
In matters of determining materiality
of evidence the trial court should be accorded a large measure of discretion and should
only be reversed if this discretion is abused.
6. Negligence $=> 124(1)
In action for injury sustained in fall on
ice on store's sidewalk, trial judge did not
abu^e his discretion in excluding summary
of weather condition at airport some 20
miles away from the store.
7. Negligence <3=> 136(22)
Evidence as to sufficiency of lighting
of sidewalk of defendant's store where
plaintiff fell at approximately 9:30 p. m.
was insufficient to take the case to the
jury.

Mark S. Miner, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.
Merlin R. Lybbert of Snow, Christensen
& Martineau, Salt Lake City, for defendant
and respondent.
SWAN, District Judge:
This is an action for personal injury
brought by Ernestina Martin, the plaintiff
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and appellant herein, to recover damages
for a broken leg resulting from a fall on a
sidewalk leading from the parking lot of
Safeway Stores to the main entrance of its
grocery store. At the conclusion of the
evidence Safeway Stores, Incorporated, the
defendant and respondent herein, moved
for a directed verdict which the trial court
granted, and it is from that ruling that the
appeal to this Court is taken.
It is uncontroverted that or. January 13,
1975, at approximately 9:30 p. m., and after
defendant's employees had closed the store
for the day's business, the plaintiff and her
husband, Abraham Martin, drove their car
to defendant's grocery store and parked in
the parking lot in a space adjoining the
sidewalk that leads to the main entrance of
the store. The plaintiff and her husband
had been married in Mexico a few days
before, and piaint:.Ts husband had brought
plaintiff to his home in Salt Lake City and
later had gone to the store intending to
purchase some groceries.
The evidence shows that it had been
snowing intermittently throughout the day
and that the Safeway employees had shoveled the snow and cleaned and salted the
sidewalk at 2:00 o'clock p. m. and again at
5:09 o'clock p. m. It was the practice of
defendant's employees to keep the sidewalk
as clean as possible to avoid water being
tracked into the store that would later have
to be mopped up.
After plaintiff's husband parked the car,
the plaintiff got out on the passenger side
in an area that was covered with snow and
ice. She proceeded onto the sidewalk and
toward the main entrance of the store. The
evidence at trial was conflicting as to exactly where the plaintiff fell, but the evidence
taken in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff indicates that she fell at a place on
the sidewalk where there was a slight spalling or flaking of the concrete. After she
fell, the plaintiff's husband helped her back
to the car and then went to the front door
of the store which was locked. He got the
attention of the defendant's inventory clerk
and a customer who was still at the checkout counter and they went to the place

where plaintiff had fallen and with the aid
of a flashlight found an icy spot about
twelve to fourteen inches in diameter. It
was this spot of ice that plaintiff contends
was the cause of plaintiff's fall and for
which the defendant should be held liable.
[1, 2] This court has held that property
owners are not insurers of the safety of
those who come upon their property, even
though they are business invitees. The liability of the owner of a store should be
established only when the condition complained of has existed for a long enough
time that the owner should have known
about it and corrected it, or has had actual
knowledge of the condition complained of.
Here the plaintiff failed to produce any
evidence to show that the danger had existed for any period of time prior to the accident. The evidence is without dispute that
snow had fallen during the day, that employees of the defendant shoveled the walkway on t.vo occasions '.nd that the walk
was salted on each occasion. Thereafter
the sidewalk was wet but not icy, and the
defendant's courtesy clerk testified that he
had walked past the area where the accident occurred some twenty to thirty times
and had observed it to be wet but had not
observed the presence of any ice.
The plaintiff presented no evidence to
show the temperature or when the freezing
could have occurred, and the only reasonable inference that could be drawn from the
evidence is that the ice formed at a time
and place where it was not observed by
defendant's employees or any customers, or
that the freezing occurred after the store
employees could reasonably have expected
customers to come to the store. The plaintiff's husband testified that the ice was
clear and was the same color as the sidewalk and could not be seen, and all of the
other witnesses concurred in this observation.
[3] The essential inquiry relating to defendant's negligence is whether the defendant's employees know, or in the exercise of
ordinary care should have known, that a
dangerous condition existed, and whether
sufficient time elapsed thereafter that ac-
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tion could have beer \V( n to correct the
situation. Owners of stores, banks, office
buildings, theaters or other buildings where
the public is invited to come on business or
for pleasure are not insurers against all
forms of accidents that may happen to any
who come. It is not the duty of persons in
control of such buildings to mop the sidewalk dry or take other steps necessary to
prevent the accumulation of moisture on
the sidewalk that might freeze and create
an icv condition. It is significant to note
tin 1 the icy spot complained of was only
twelve inches by fourteen inches in area,
and the evidence shows that the area where
the spalling occurred was much larger than
the icy area described by the witnesses.
The plaintiff's physicist conducted an experiment and found that \ ater would only
accumulate to a depth of one-fourth inch in
the ^palling area before running off the
sidewalk, a^d it cannot be the duty of persons in control of su^h biddings to seek out
and mop d^v all <uch depressions in the
waPxWa}s and approaches to such buildings.

the Salt Lake Airport is immaterial to
prove the weather condition at Midvale
some twenty miles away. Throop v. F. E.
Young & Co., 94 Ariz. 146, 382 P.2d 560
(1963); Tucker v. Lower, 200 Kan. 1, 434
P.2d 320 (1967); Gunderson v. Brewster,
154 Mont. 405, 466 P.2d 589 (1970); Carter
v. Moberly, 263 Or. 193, 501 P 2d 1276
(1972).
The Utah Rules of Evidence provide:
Rule 45. The judge may in his discretion
exclude evidence if he finds that its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk that its admission
will . . .
(b) create substantial danger of undue
prejudice or of confusing the issues or
of misleading the jury.

This Court held in De Weesc v. J. C
Penney Co., (supra)
It is recognized that in this mountain
valley storms are sometimes spotty and
inegular as to time and place of starting,
duration and amount of precipitation.
5 Utah 2d at 122, 297 t 2d at 902.
[11 The trial courf found that defendant
If plaintiff's attorney felt that it was
had laVr>n all reasonable precautions to
necessary
to prove what the weather was
keep th<> walkwav clean ^ of snow, and
T
1
on
iTii-ry
13, 1975 in the area of the store,
saltc* -md could not be charged with a duty
he
id
a\ailable
ample direct means by
1
of k'epimr the sidewa' ; ' \ and free from
que
Mon'ng
witnesses
who were present
M
ice p\ MI af'er the jme for ' 1 )si g the store.
and
conce
ned
with
the
v eathjr on the dav
TV *rul court * 'tenuis that as a matter
l
of
'
<
evident.
of la ' reasonable i >ncK v-("' 1 not differ in
[5, *i] TTh<
fi dino- that the de'2nd?nt's employees had
V lala- is clef r that in matters of
j 5 r
n * t c iUty under the circumstance in detenn-ninpr matana'ib the trai court
mining *h n'dewnlk *vasonably safe, and should b^ accoried d l ^ e measure of d'athat »v> Q\ i lence was presented as to how cretif; and .^hoidc, only ui reversed if this
long t n e ice was pr^en: oi that the employ- discretion is abused The weather report
ees of the -tore Ind or in thf exercise of oflerel ?^ r> hibit " 4 - P ' had very si'Jlj, if
reasonable care co"l' have had notice of the any, proljati-e value a id it ^uM have Crocond'Hon ' nd an opportunity to correct it. at d a substantia' *sk of confusing the
It is our opinion t\ °t the evidence justifies issues. The judge oi 1 not abuse his discrethe trial court so ruling a^ a matter of law. tion in excluding it.
See be Wcese v J C. Penney Co, 5 Utah
[7] The plaintiff further contends tiiat
2d 116, 297 P.2d ^ 3 .
some neon lights wrr _ '>r< 1-en and not lightThe plaintiff offered an exhibit showing ed, and that th'a 'onst't ited further
the weather conditions at the Salt Lake grounds of negligence for which the deCity \irport o r the month of January of fendant should be 1" tb!e. The evidence is
1975. The trial court sustained an objection without dispute that these lights had been
to the exmbit on the grounds that an exhib- or^inallv installed for decorative purposes
it th-U suhi'nam >d *he weather condition at bu ha 1 been inoperathe for saveral \ears.
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The evidence is without dispute that there
were three large parking lights in the parking lot, that they were lighted at the time
of the accident and they illuminated the
entire area outside the store. The trial
court did not find evidence of insufficient
lighting that would take the case to the
jury, nor do we
Not every accident that occurs gives rise
to a cause of action upon which the party
injured may recover damages from someone. Thousands of accidents occur every
day for wrhich no one is liable in damages,
and often no one is to blame, not even the
ones who are injured. The character or
extent of an injury may have no bearing
upon the question of the liability therefor;
neither has the wealth no*- the poverty of
either party to such a Miration anything to
do \\ i*h the quest><>n of liability for the
accident.
The decision of i]" Hal ^ou.-t directing a
verdict in favor of the defendant is aff u mod.
ELLETT C. J., ard CPOPKETT, J , concur
WII KINS, J

concurs in result.

^AlTr.RAN J., dissenis

M. Hanson, Sr., J., denied defendant's motion to set aside default judgment on
ground that he had not been personally
served and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court, Wiikins, J., held that in view
of dispute on fact of usual place of abode of
the defendant, arising from notation on return of process indicating that defendant
lived with his mother and allegations in
defendant's complaint denying that he was
residing with his parents at time service
was made upon his mother, court should
have held an evidentiary hearing on the
disputed factual issue.
Reversed and rema ided.
Crockett, J., filed concurring opinion.

Process c^79
In \iew of dispute on fact of usual
place of abode of the defendant, arising
from notation on return of process indicating that defendant iiv,'d with his mother
and allegations in defendant's complaint denying that he was residi \g with his parents
at time service wras made upon his mother,
coiir* should have held ?n evidentiary hearing on the disputed factual issue Rules of
Civi Ptocedure, rules 4'e), 43(e), 60(b).

T

*ALL, J , does not participate herein.
/wV

v

Gregory B. Wall, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant
0,-ry A. Weston, Salt Lake City, for
plamtiff and respondent.

ST\N KATZ REM. ESTATE, INC., a
corporation, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Daniel 0. CF VVEZ, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 14775.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 20, 1977.
In brei^h of contra*** action, the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Stewart

WTLKINS, Justice:
On April 18, 1974, the plaintiff filed a
complaint against the defendant in the District Court of Salt Lake County seeking
damage for the latter \\ alleged breach of
contract. Service of process was made by a
depvity constable on May 22, 1974, who left
a copy of the summons and complaint with
the defendant's mother at 1118 West
Eighth South, Salt Lake City, Utah. A
typewritten notation was placed on the
proof o r service return as follows:
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ute, Bankruptcy Act of 1898). See also
Restatement of Security § 202 (1941).
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed, and the case is remanded for entry
of judgment against Northwestern National Insurance Company on its attachment
release bond in accordance with this opinion. Costs on appeal are awarded to respondent Fitzgerald.
GREENWOOD and DAVIDSON, JJ.,
concur.
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Dianne O'BRIEN, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Mike RUSH dba Mike's Garage,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 860078-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Oct. 13, 1987.
Customer brought action against mechanic, seeking damages for difference between amount she paid for work performed
on vehicle and value of that work and for
depreciation of vehicle's value during time
vehicle was wrongfully held by mechanic
and punitive damages. The Second District
Court, Weber County, John F. Wahlquist,
J., entered judgment awarding customer
compensatory and punitive damages, and
mechanic appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Davidson, J., held that: (1) determination
that value of work performed on customer's vehicle was only $500 was not abuse of
trial court's discretion; (2) trial court could
use "blue book" as basis for determining
average depreciation that applied to customer's vehicle during ten months vehicle
was wrongfully retained; and (3) customer
was entitled to punitive damages.
Affirmed.

1. Appeal and Error <s=> 1008.1(5)
Trial court's findings of fact based on
expert testimony were not clearly erroneous and thus, would not be set aside on
appeal. Rules of Evid., Rule 702; Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 52(a).
2. Automobiles <3=368
Determination that value of work mechanic performed on customer's vehicle
was only $500, rather than $2,130.01
charged to customer, was not abuse of trial
court's discretion, based on expert testimony and evidence that work was not properly performed.
3. Automobiles <3=>368
Trial court was entitled to use National
Automobile Dealers Association Official
Used Car Guide, or "blue book," as basis
for calculating average depreciation of customer's vehicle during ten months vehicle
was wrongfully retained by mechanic, particularly where mechanic failed to submit
contrary evidence concerning vehicle's depreciation. Rules of Evid., Rule 803(17).
4. Appeal and Error <s=*173(2)
Issue of mitigation of damages could
not be raised for first time on appeal In
customer's action against mechanic for
wrongfully retaining her vehicle.
5. Damages <3=>91(1)
Evidence that mechanic took full advantage of customer's lack of knowledge oi
automotive matters by willfully charging
premium prices for used parts, failing to
properly repair vehicle, insisting on repayment on terms other than those to which
mechanic initirlly agreed and wrongfully
retaining vehicle warranted award of punitive damages to customer.
6. Costs ^260(1)
Showing of bad faith is not required to
award attorney fees for ^ringing frivolous
appeal. Court of Appeals Rule 33(a).
7. Costs <e=>260(t)
"Frivolous appeal," for purposes of
rule permitting award of attorney fees
against party who brings frivolous appeal.

O'BRIEN v. RUSH
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has no reasonable legal or factual basis, as
defined in rule requiring counsel to sign
each motion, brief, and other paper warranting that action is well grounded in fact
and warranted by existing law or goodfaith argument and is not interposed for
improper purposes. Court of Appeals
Rules 33(a), 40(a).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

8. Costs <3=>260(4)
"Appeal brought for delay," for purposes of rule authorizing award of attorney
fees against party for bringing appeal for
delay, is marked by dilatory conduct or
conduct designed to mislead court and such
appeal only benefits appellant. Court of
Appeals Rule 33(a).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
9. Costs ®=>260(5)

Customer was entitled to award of attorney fees upon mechanic's appeal from
judgment awarding customer difference
between "amount she paid for work performed on vehicle and value of that work
and damages resulting from depreciation
of-vehicle's vralue during time vehicle was
wrongfully held by mechanic; mechanic
should have realized appeal had no reasonable iegal or factual basis. Court of Appeals Rule 33(a).
John T. Caine, Richards, Caine & Richards, Public Defender Ass'n, Ogden, for
defendant-appellant.
Hoy Schunk. Ogden, for plaintiff-respondent.
OPINION
Before ORME, DAVIDSON and
GARFF, JJ.
DAVIDSON, Judge:
Defendant appeals from the judgment of
the Second District Court which awarded
plaintiff the difference between the amount
she paid for work performed on her vehicle
and the value of that work; the damages
resulting from depreciation of the vehicle's
value durl! >r the time it was wrongfully
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held by defendant and punitive damages.
We affirm and remand.
On May 16, 1983, plaintiff experienced
engine problems with her 1976 Volkswagen
bus. The following day, plaintiff drove the
vehicle to defendant's garage where defendant tentatively diagnosed the problem
as a blown engine which would require a
major overhaul. At trial, plaintiff contended that defendant quoted the repair cost to
be a minimum of $1,000.00 to $1,200.00
while defendant claimed he informed plaintiff that the repairs would cost between
$1,200.00 and $1,600.00. Plaintiff consented to work beginning on the vehicle. Defendant testified that additional problems
were found and that on June 15, 1983, he
obtained plaintiffs approval for those repairs which would increase the cost to over
$1,800.00. Upon completion of the repairs,
plaintiff was presented with a bill for
$2,130.01.
Plaintiff paid defendant $1,600.00, with a
promise to pay the remainder, and defendant released the vehicle to her. Almost
immediately, the vehicle developed an oil
leak which was repaired by defendant for a
parts charge of $2.37. During August
1923 while plaintiff vas returning to Utah
from Idaho, plaintiffi; vehicle suffered a
fire in the engine compartment and was
later towed to defendant's garage. Defendant performed uia gnostic work on the
vehicle to determine the cause of the fire
for which he charged plaintiff $34.21.
Plaintiff claims that defendant offered to
repair the resultant damage for §1,000.00
but she declined and requested that the
vehicle be released to her. Defendant refused to comply and held the vehicle on a
claimed mechanics' lien because plaintiff
still owed on the original work order, for
the oil leak repair part, and for the diagnosis concerning the fire's cause. Defendant
contended that plaintiff refused to execute
a written agreement promising to pay the
amount due according lo a specific schedule. Defendant held plaintiffs vehicle for
almost cen months until approximately July
17, 1984, at which time she obtained a bond
to necure its release. Trial to the court
was held on September 20, 1984, at which
time expert testimony was admitted which
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enabled the court to establish the value of
the work performed by defendant. Additionally, evidence was presented which was
utilized to determine the vehicle's depreciation.
The trial court made numerous findings
of fact upon which the conclusions of law
and the judgment were based. Those conclusions most pertinent to this appeal are:
1. That the work done by the Defendant
is in the amount of Five Hundred Dollars
($500.00). This takes into consideration
the Court's finding that obviously the
work was not properly done or the oil
leaks would not have been there, the
over-charging for some parts, and the
failure of the evidence to disclose the
value of the broken part which was installed, the new clutch which was installed, and the value of any other work
which may remain. The Court's fixing
of the sum of $500.00 [is] the best the
Court can do on the evidence here
presented.
3. That the Claim for the existence of a
lien is unfounded in law. That the possession of the vehicle was released upon
a promise to pay and a now obligation
took its place. The return of the vehicle
was not for further work but in an effort
to settle a dispute over the other work
which was done and did not reactivate
(he Hen.
4. That insistence upon the lien has
caused the Plaintiff to lose the use of the
veh'cle during that period of time, and
concludes that the [vehicle] depreciated
in value approximately Eii;ht Hundred
Dollars ($800.00) during the period of
time.
7. The Court finds >hat the Defendant
has made unwarranted claims that he
had done work on the engine and installed proper gaskets when he had not done
so. The Court further finds that the
Defendant asserted charges for parts
that fwere) above and beyond that norI. This conclusion of law appears to contain the
i'imiinys of !:. ' upon which i: is based. Regardless of t!: • placement of ihc findings, they will

mal in the trade. The Court further
finds that Defendant, in reckless disregard of whether the lien was or was
not valid, inserted the presence of the
lien and held up the delivery of the vehicle for many months. The Court considers that this is a valid consumer's
complaint for unwarranted over-charging
and assertions of invalid liens and assesses punitive damages in the amount of
One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) therefor.1
The trial court's judgment was signed on
October 17, 1984, and provides that plaintiff shall receive $1,100.00 as the difference
between the amount she paid for defendant's work and the value thereof, damages
resulting from the vehicle's depreciation in
value in the amount of $800.00 during the
wrongful impoundment, and punitive damages of $1,000.00. Attorney fees of $1.00
were also awarded because of the unlawful
assertion of the lien by defendant. Because no evidence was offered as to the
proper amount, the $1.00 was awarded.
Defendant filed his notice of appeal on
November 12, 1984.
[1] At trial, in addition to the parties,
the trial court heard u e testimony of three
witnesses; one t;T defendant's witnesses
was accepted by thn • ourt as an expert in
automotive repairs pursuant to Utah
R.Evid. !0'A. Plaintiffs witness was a
school teacher who for approximately 2o
years als'o operated a machine shop which
primarily worked on automobile engines.
Defendant':; other witness was an individual he employed ao a mechanic. Utah
K.Civ.P. 52(a) states that findings of fact
"shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity Gf the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses." We accept
the findings of fac* of the trial court as
they are based on the expert testimony,
because Ihey cannot be categorized as
"clearly erroneous," and they also appear
to comply with the Utah Supreme Court's
be considered in the same manner as if they
were more conventionally placed.
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pronouncements concerning findings as
stated in Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996,
999 (Utah 1987).
[2] Defendant asserts that the trial
court erred in finding that the value of
defendant's work performed was only
$500.00. In addition to what we have already stated concerning findings of fact,
this issue is effectively disposed of by the
Utah Supreme Court in Clayton v. Crossroads Equipment Co., 655 P.2d 1125, 1130
(Utah 1982), where Justice Howe wrote,
"In fixing damages the trial court is vested
with broad discretion and the award will
not be set aside unless it is manifestly
unjust or indicates that the trial court neglected pertinent elements, or was unduly
influenced by prejudice or other extraneous
circumstances." Essentially, the court below had to determine what damages plaintiff suffered when she paid for work which
was not properly performed. We believe
the trial court carefully weighed the testimony and determined the value of the work
performed by defendant which was then
subtracted from what plaintiff had previously paid. She had bargained for a proper
engine overhaul but received something far
less. The damage award on this issue is
affirmed.
[3] Defendant contends that there is insufficient evidence to sustain the trial
court's award of $800.00 as the vehicle's
depreciation during the period it was held
by defendant. The trial transcript indicates that the court received a copy of the
National Automobile Dealers Association
Official Used Car Guide (Sept. 1984) into
evidence. This is the "blue book" referred
to by counsel in the transcript and it provides a range of prices for used cars back
to and including 1977 models. Plaintiffs
counsel suggested that an average depreciation could be determined which could be
applied to 1976 model vehicles. Defendant
failed to submit contrary evidence concerning the vehicle's depreciation. The trial
court based its conclusion as to the depreciation on a "published [compilation], generally used and relied upon by the public or
by persons in particular occupations."
Utah Rlivid. 803(17).

[4] Defendant also raises the issue of
plaintiffs failure to mitigate her damages
by failing to post a bond to secure release
of her vehicle. Plaintiffs mitigation of
damages was not at issue at trial and will
not now be heard for the first time on
appeal. Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d
100, 102 (Utah 1983).
[5] Defendant objects to the award of
punitive damages as being unsupported by
the evidence. At kin Wright & Miles r.
Mountain States Tel., 709 P.2d 330, 337
(Utah 1985), states "Before punitive damages may be awrarded, the plaintiff must
prove conduct that is willful and malicious,
or that manifests a knowing and reckless
indifference and disregard toward the
rights of others" (citations omitted). See
Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80 (Utah App.
1987). The court below concluded that defendant exhibited a reckless disregard toward the validity of the lien upon which he
held plaintiffs vehicle. The evidence
shows defendant's conduct throughout this
matter as being rather cavi_lier as it relates
to the Pmount of time he took in making
his repairs, the manner in which the repairs
were conducted as evidenced by plaintiffs
continuing problems and her vehicle's subsequent repair by another mechanic, and
defendant's unwarranted insistence on repayment on terms other than those to
which he initially agreed. The totality of
the circumstances supports the conclusion
that defendant took full advantage of plaintiffs lack of knowledge of automotive matters and her problems at that moment in
time. His willful use of used parts, while
charging premium prices for them as if
they were new, is unconscionable. The
award of punitive damages is proper. This
is exactly the type of case calling for their
award.
[6] Plaintiff requests attorney fees incurred in responding to this appeal. This
Court in Eames v. Envies, 735 P.2d 395,
398 (Utah App.1987), awarded attorney
fees in a situation in which the "totality of
defendant's argument" caused us to believe the appeal was frivolous. That alone
meets the technical requirements of R.Utah
Ct.App. 33(a). However, we then went on
to state that defendant's argument "fails
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to meet th.» s t n ^ h n l s of g<v:d faith and

R.Utah Ct.App. WM-x) appliesA Id. The
last statement would tend to imply that
R.Utah Ct.App. 33(a) requires this Court to
find bad faith before attorney fees can be
awarded. This is not so. Cady v-. Johnson, 671 P.2d .149 (Utah 1983), which was
cited in Ea?nes concerns the award of attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-27-56 (1981). The standard in that
section specifically includes an examination
into the good faith of a litigant. That is
appropriate in the trial court which is already involved in receiving evidence. Such
a subjective standard is inappropriate for
an appellate court.
Rule 33(a) states that attorney fees may
be awarded when the "motion made or an
appeal taken under these rules is either
frivolous or for delay
" While it may
be possible to determine when an action is
taken for delay, the question of what is a
frivolous appeal is more difficult. In
Cady, 671 P.2d at 151, the Utah Supreme
Court equated frivolous with being without
merit. We agree. A frivolous appeal is
one without merit. But something more
must be required or we will find ourselves
in a "loser pay" situation.
[7,81 In reviewing the body of the
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals we find
Rule 40(a) v/hich gives some guidance.
This rule requires counsel, or a party if
without counsel, to sign each "motion,
brief, and other paper...." The rule further states:
The signature of an attorney or a party
constitutes a certificate that the attorney
or the party has read the motion, brief,
or other paper; that to the best of the
attorney's or the party's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in
fact and is warranted by existing law or
a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law;
and that it is not interposed for any
improper purposes such as to harass or
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
This language offers a definition of what is
frivolous. Further, the definition is sufficiently objective that this court can apply it
without di-lving into the subieeiive intent of

the parties. For purposes of Rule 33(a) of
the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals we
define a "frivolous appeal" as one having
no reasonable legal or factual basis as defined in Rule 40(a). An appeal brought for
delay is one marked by dilatory conduct or
conduct designed to mislead the court and
which benefits only the appellant.
[9] It may be argued that the imposition of this definition creates a lesser standard than that created by Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-27-56 (1981) which requires lack of
good faith. We do not disagree. However, since a party has already been to
court once and has had the benefit of one
ruling, the decision to appeal should be
reached only after careful consideration by
the party and counsel.
Applying the above analysis to this case
it is obvious that the trial court found no
merit in the contentions of defendant In
reviewing the trial results it should have
been equally obvious that the appeal had
no reasonable legal or factual basis. The
record shows that defendant took advantage of plaintiff both through unfair dealings with her and by holding her vehicle
for an extended period of time without
regard to her rights. It is apparent that
defendant intended to force plaintiff to pay
by holding her vehicle and thereby causing
her greal inconvenience. The record further shows the trial jud^e carefully fashioning relief after a fair opportunity for
hearing. Defendant's claims on appeal
simply controvert the findings of the court
The clains are eot only without merit but
are also without basis in ;aw or fact
Plaintiff is ' n J t ' j l to the benefit of Rule
33(a).
The judiiruent of the crial court is affirmed and the case is remanded for a
determination of plaintiTs attorney fees
on appeal which are ordered to be paid by
defendant.
Double costs are ordered
against deAndant pursuant to R.Utah Ct.
App. 33(a).
ORME and GARFF, J.J., concur.

CADY v.
Citeas671 P.2d

so insubstantial or inconclusive that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime charged.23
[11] Defendant contends that the plaintiff's evidence failed to show that defendant acted with the requisite criminal negligence in causing the death of Nina Fuelleman. Our review of the record, however,
leads to a contrary conclusion. There was
ample evidence adduced at trial to establish
defendant's criminal negligence. That evidence is: (1) defendant knew that Nina
Fuelleman was somewhere in the house
during the argument between Robert and
himself, because the three had come home
together; (2) immediately following the argument, defendant went to his bedroom
and took out the rifle; (3) live ammunition
was found near where defendant was
standing when the gun fired, supporting
the inference that defendant loaded the gun
or knew it was loaded; (4) defendant was
pointing the gun in the direction of his
brother when it fired; (5) the gun could not
have ftred unless the trigger was pulled
with a conscious effort; (6) the rifle wras
held at or near the shoulder, supporting the
inference that defendant was aiming or attempting to aim the gun when it fired; (7)
defendant lied to the police about why he
was holding the gun, supporting the inference that the gun did not fire accidentally;
and (8) the gun was fired while defendant
held it, killing Nina Fuelleman. We consider this evidence to be substantial and
sufficiently conclusive to sustain the trial
court's verdict.
The conviction and judgment of the trial
court are affirmed.
STEWART, OAKS, HOWE and DURHAM, JJ., concur.
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23. State v. Kerekes, Utah, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168
(1930); State v. Romero, Utah, 554 P.2d 216,
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Jon Michael CADY and Carolyn Cady,
husband and wife, Telford Realty Company and Rich Edwards, dba All Seasons
Realty, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
Reta May JOHNSON and Jared L. Johnson, Defendants and Respondents.
No. 18373.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept. 20, 1983.

Prospective vendors, realty company,
and salesman who prepared offer brought
action against prospective sellers, who indicated their desire not to purchase home,
seeking damages for expenses incurred in
having to resell home and damages on behalf of all plaintiffs for loss of real estate
commission. The Second District Court,
Davis County, Douglas L. Cornaby, J., entered judgment against plaintiffs and
awarded defendants attorney fees, and appeal was taken. The Supreme Court,
Howe, J., held that: (1) plaintiffs were not
entitled to recover for lost real estate commission, and (2) defendants were improperly awarded attorney fees.
Affirmed in part and vacated in part.

1. Principal and Agent o=>12
Only a written power of attorney will
authorize one to bind another to a contract
for the sale of real property.
2. Principal and Agent e=>12
Since there was no written power of
attorney allowing one defendant to enter
into agreement on behalf of his mother,
another defendant, and therefore no authorization was established, there was no contract nor any right to recover under theories of donee or creditor beneficiaries, and
219 (1976).
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thus cause of action in which plaintiffs
sought lost real estate commission was
properly dismissed.
3. Costs o=»173(l)
Even though prospective vendors, realty company, and salesman who prepared
offer had no legal basis for recovery of
additional damages after prospective vendors had retained earnest money deposit, so
that their claim was without merit, prospective purchasers were not entitled to recover
attorney fees, in that plaintiffs' conduct did
not rise to level of lack of good faith. U.C.
A.1953, 78-27-56.

Melvin C. Wilson, Farmington, for plaintiffs and appellants.
C. DeMont Judd, Jr., Ogden, for defendants and respondents.
HOWE, Justice:
This appeal arises from a suit brought by
plaintiffs Jon and Carolyn Cady, husband
and wife, Teiford Realty and Rich Edwards.
On July 8, 1980, the Cadys received a written offer from defendants, Jared and Reta
May Johnson, to purchase their home in
Kaysville, Utah. At that time the home
was being advertised for sale by Telford
Realty under a listing agreement. Rich
Edwards, a salesman for All Seasons Realty, prepared the offer which was signed
"Reta May Johnson by Jared Johnson, son"
as purchaser. Jared also gave Edwards a
$500 check drawn on his mother's bank
account as earnest money. The Cadys accepted the offer.
On August 19, 1980. the Cadys vacated
their home. A closing date on the sale was
set for August 25. Financing arrangements had been submitted and approved.
On August 25, the defendants did not appear for closing. One week later, Edwards
received a letter from defendants indicating
their desire not to purchase the home and
requesting the return of their $500 earnest
money deposit. Plaintiffs refused, retained
the earnest money deposit and brought suit
for additional damages for breach, of con-

tract or, in the alternative, for equitable
relief for failure to perform the contract.
Plaintiffs' first cause of action sought
damages for expenses they incurred in having to re-sell their home. This action was
dismissed at trial on their own motion on
the strength of Andreasen r. Hansen, 8
Utah 2d 370, 335 P.2d 404 (1959), and has
not been appealed. Their second cause of
action sought damages on behalf of all
plaintiffs for the lost real estate commission. They contend that Edwards, who received nothing when the home was later
re-sold, should receive the value of his services under a principle of either equity or
third-party beneficiary contract, despite the
Cadys' election to retain the earnest money
as liquidated damages. In their answer,
defendants alleged that Jared Johnson was
not properly authorized to enter into the
agreement in behalf of Reta May Johnson,
his mother. They also alleged that plaintiffs holding real estate licenses knew or
should have known that the statute of
frauds, U.C.A., 1953, § 25-5-1, requires
written authorization from one to allow another to bind him to a contract for the
purchase of real property. The trial court
dismissed the second cause of action pursuant to § 25-5-1.
Defendants then asked that attorney's
fees be awarded them pursuant to U.C.A.,
1953, § 78-27-56, and the trial court
awarded $1,592 in fees against plaintiffs.
The amount was based on figures presented
by defendants' attorney that he and former
counsel had spent 24.5 hours at $65.00 per
hour in defending the lawsuit. The trial
court found this amount reasonable. I*i
ad livm. the trial cou^t entered supplemental findings of fact that plaintiffs did not
have an actionable claim; yet they had
assured the trial judge that there would be
mat-dial issues at ir\i>\ and it was not until
trial that the judge found there were no
such issues. It was also concluded by the
trial judge that ha I plaintiffs researched
the law, they wou-d have known their
claims were meritless and could have saved
the court time in not having to go to trial.
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|1,2] Plaintiffs now contend that the
trial court erred in summarily dismissing
their second cause of action without addressing the issues of whether or not plaintiffs were donee or creditor beneficiaries.
We disagree. Before considering what type
of contract exists, the trial court must satisfy the most fundamental of contract law
principles; that is, was there a contract?
Utah law is clear that only a written power
of attorney will authorize one to bind another to a contract for the sale of real
property.
No estate or interest in real property . . .
shall be created . . . otherwise than by
deed or conveyance in writing subscribed
by the party creating . . . or by his lawful
agent thereunto authorized by writing.
U.C.A., § 25-5-1 (1953 as amended).
In the instant case, there was no dispute as
to the absence of the written power of
attorney. Therefore, no authorization was
ever established. There being no authorization, there could be no contract; there being no contract, Lhere could be no right to
recover under theories of donee or creditor
beneficiaries. Therefore, the trial court
correctly dismissed the plaintiffs' second
cause of action.
Plaintiffs also contend that the trial court
erred in awarding attorney's fees to defendants pursuant to U.CA./l9"3, § 78-27-56
which was enact' d in 1981 providing that:
In civil actions, where not otherwise provided by st.itute or agreement, the court
may award reasonable attorney's fees to
a prevailing party if the court determines
that the action or defense to the action
was without merit and not brought or
asserted in good faith.
[3] The statute is narrowly drawn. It
was not meant to be applied to all prevailing parties in all civil suits. To safeguard
against too broad an application, two elements are required in addition to being a
prevailing party. First, the claim must be
"without merit." We have not heretofore
had occasion to define this term. However,
under a provision of the Federal Securities
Act which awards attorney's fees "if the
court believes the suit or defense to have

been without merit," it was stated in CanAm Petroleum Co. v. Beck, 331 F.2d 371
(10th Cir.1964), that the term implies bordering on frivolity. The dictionary definition of "frivolous" is "of little weight or
importance having no basis in law or fact."
While there may be some distinction between these two terms in other areas of the
law, for purposes of this statute we believe
the terms are synonymous. While this definition may lack some of the nuances found
in common law definitions, it adequately
serves the purpose of the statute before us
and is clearly understood. See Morton v.
Allied Stores Corp., 90 F.R.D. 352 (D.Colo.
1981). In the instant case, the plaintiffs
clearly had no legal basis for recovery of
additional damages after the Cadys had retained the earnest money deposit, Andreasen v. Hansen, supra, and in face of the
statute of frauds. Therefore, we affirm the
trial court's finding that the claim was
"without merit."
In addition to finding the claim to lack
merit, the trial court must also find that
plaintiffs' conduct in bringing suit was
lacking in good faith. In Tacoma Assoc of
Credit Men v. Lester, 72 Wash.2d 453, 458,
433 P.2d 901, 904 (1967), the court defined
"g<.'»d faith" as:
(1) An honest belief in the propriety of
' b - activities in question; (2) no intent to
take unconscionable advantage of others;
and (3) no intent to. ;>r knowledge of the
fact that the activities in question will,
[sic] hinder, delay or defraud others.
To establish lack of good faith, one must
prove that one or more of these factors is
lacking. Sparkman and McLean Co. v. Berber, 4 Wash.App. 341. 481 P.2d 585 (1971).
The federal courts offer a similar definition, however, inversely stated. Bad faith
must be found in order to award attorney's
fees to a prevailing party. See Ki linearWeed Corp. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.,
441 F.2d 631 (5th Cir.1971); Cleveland v.
Second Natl Bank & Trust Co., 149 F.2d
466 (6th Cir.1945). Bad faith is found when
one of the three elements heretofore stated
is lacking. While there may be a distinction between bad faith and "lack of good
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faith" in other areas of the law. for purposes of U.C.A., 1953, § 78-27-56, the two
terms are synonymous.
Attorney's fees have boon denied where
the proceedings instituted by the unsuccessful party were not initiated in bad faith or
for the purpose of vexation or harassment.
See Medtronic, Inc. v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 468 F.Supp. 1132 (D.Minn.1980);
Walker v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc., 443 F.2d 33 (7th Cir.1971). In Catanzaro v. Masco Corp., 423 F.Supp. 415 (D.Del.
1976), the court refused to grant attorney's
fees, although plaintiffs' action for patent
infringement was legally unsupportable
where the record did not affirmatively establish either bad faith or the possibility of
self-induced myopia. In Chicago Title &
Trust Co. v. Fox Theaters Corp., 178
F.Supp. 899 (D.N.Y.1959), the court denied
the respondent's request for attorney's fees,
notwithstanding dismissal of the petition in
a twenty-year-old equity receivership action. The proceeding was doubtless lacking
in merit, the court conceded, adding however, thai it could not be said that it was
necessarily brought in bad faith or for purposes of vexation or harassment. In other
words, not only must there be substantial
evidence that the claim was lacking basis in
either b T " o** fact and therefore frivolous,
but. there must also be sufficient evidence
that the unsuccessful party lacked at least
one of the good faith elements heretofore
stated. See Sparkman and McLean Co.,
supra, \). r>91.

(although ill-formed) belief in their claim;
that they had an intent to take an unconscionable advantage of defendants; nor
that they had the intent to, or knowledge
that their suit would hinder, delay or defraud defendants. Tacorna Assoc, of Credit
Men v. Lester, supra.

In the inr-tant case, the •rial co^rt found
lack '.f >rood faith because had plaintiffs
research' h the issue as instructed at pre-trial conference, thev woald have Uncovered
they had no valid claim and they could have
saved the court valuable time by avoiding
trial. We disagree that this conduct constitutes bad faith. Plaintiffs were clearly
pursuing a merit Jess claim and better preparation might well have disclosed that to
them. However, that conduct does not rise
to lack of good faith. The evidence must
also affirmatively establish a lack of at
least one of the three elements of good
faith heretofore discussed. There was no
evidence that plaintiffs lacked an honest

Defendant was convicted \n the Third
District <\>ur!f Salt Lake O-j.-tv, Kryant H.
Croft, J., '>i burglary, av.i he appealed.
The Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that:
(1) "necessarily included oifense" standard
for determining whether to give instruction
on lesser included offen-e should be limited
to cases vhere prosecution requests instruction, and vhere defendant requests instruction, standard is whether evidence warrants
it, and (2) evidence did not warrant giving
of instruction on offense of criminal trespass.

The judgment is affirmed except the
award of attorney's fees to defendants is
vacated. Each party to bear his own costs.
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, OAKS and
DURHAM, JJ., concur.
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